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Abstract
In contemporary theoretical physics, the powerful notion of symmetry stands for a web of intricate
meanings among which I identify four clusters associated with the notion of transformation, comprehension,
invariance and projection. While their interrelations are examined closely these four facets of symmetry
are scrutinised one after the other in great detail. This decomposition allows us to carefully examine the
multiple different roles symmetry plays in many places in physics. Furthermore, some connections with
other disciplines like neurobiology, epistemology, cognitive sciences and, not least, philosophy are proposed
in an attempt to show that symmetry can be an organising principle also in these fields.
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2
1 Introduction
During the twentieth century, the development of
quantum physics and relativity came with a seman-
tic shift of the word “symmetry” in accordance with
the increasing power of such a conceptual instrument.
Mathematicians and theoretical physicists have en-
larged its meaning far beyond the one it had in
the previous centuries (Hon and Goldstein, 2008).
Among the multiple uses of symmetry in theoreti-
cal physics and more generally in science, I propose
to discern four clusters associated with the notion of
transformation, comprehension, invariance and pro-
jection. After having defined these four facets in the
next section, I will discuss them individually with
more details in sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
These four notions are more or less explicit and fully
recognised in the natural philosophy since its very
beginning but, as far as I know, addressed with very
loose relations between them, if any. The contem-
porary theoretical physics point of view on symme-
try offers a new and very precise way to tightly bind
these notions together and cross-fertilise them. To
make a long story short, originally being an aesthetic
criterion, symmetry evolves in science into an efficient
method of classification before it becomes a powerful
theoretical tool to guide and even dictate our way
of constructing models and theories. More precisely,
symmetry allows
1◦. to build (linear) algebraic representations2;
2◦. to constrain yet to unify interactions in the mod-
els of theoretical physics;
3◦. to extract universal properties in statistical
physics and in non-linear dynamics;
2I use the epithet “algebraic” to reinforce the distinction
between a) the precise mathematical meaning of “representa-
tion” in the present context (see also § 3.4.1, Fig. 2 below),
b) the “internal” meaning it takes in cognitive science (mental
representation) and c) the usual “external” meaning (model,
symbol, image, spoken word, written sign, play, etc.). All the
three significations share the common point of being associated
to a correspondence and can refer to the target, the domain of
a mapping, one of their elements or the mapping itself. Some
confusion usually raises when the domain and the target are
not clearly distinguished.
4◦. to solve dynamical equations by reducing the
numbers of degrees of freedom and establishing
the bridge between integrable and chaotic dyna-
mics;
5◦. to predict selection rules.
Examples of 2◦ are the unification of inertial and
gravitational forces in the theory of general relativity
and the mixing between electromagnetic and weak in-
teractions in the Standard Model of elementary parti-
cle physics. Conservation laws are particularly man-
ifest in 4◦ and 5◦. Above all, the selection rules con-
cern quantum processes but, as constraints on the
evolution of a system, they can be found in classical
dynamics as well: the conservation of the angular mo-
mentum of a particle evolving freely within a circular
billiard (with elastic reflexions on its boundaries) ex-
plains the impossibility of the inversion of the sense of
its rotation around the centre. But any small generic
deformation of the billiard boundary, even a small
bump, can revert angular momentum (still conserv-
ing the energy) and, actually, this breaking of rota-
tional invariance gives room to chaotic motion. In
this essay I will have to say more about 1◦ in § 3.4.1
and I will focus on 3◦ in § 4.5.2.
The roles 1◦–5◦ were discovered/invented by physi-
cists essentially during the twentieth century (for a
deep insight of these issues see the synthesis by Brad-
ing and Castellani, 2003, in particular § 1). These
powerful functions of symmetry, far from erasing it,
strengthen what is certainly the most important one:
the fact that symmetry allows
6◦. to classify.
Performing classification concerns domains broader
that the one of crystals, quantum particles, living or-
ganisms, historical periods, languages and philoso-
phical camps: any law of nature can also be seen as
a manifestation of an objective regularity and I will
try to show how the modern interpretations of sym-
metry allow to give a precise and, above all, coherent
meaning of the terms “objective” and “regularity”. It
provides a rigorous ground for the meaning of univer-
sality. It also concerns the quantitative approach of
inference and understanding. Some connections with
the dual enquiry for emergence and reduction can
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also be drawn. Last but not least, these conceptions
of symmetry shed light on a (the ?) characteristic
of intelligence, namely modeling, and on an elemen-
tary process necessary for rational thinking, namely
abstraction. Since,
The whole of science is nothing more than a
refinement of every day thinking. It is for this
reason that the critical thinking of the physicist
cannot possibly be restricted to the examina-
tion of the concepts of his own specific field. He
cannot proceed without considering critically a
much more difficult problem, the problem of an-
alyzing the nature of everyday thinking (Ein-
stein, 1936, § 1, p. 349),
this feedback of the concept of symmetry from
physics to science and from science to rational think-
ing is quite natural after all.
Twenty years ago, Edelman foresaw that there may
be some possible connections between an epistemol-
ogy based on norms elaborated by natural selective
processes and the notion of symmetry as developed by
physicists. In some sense, a part of the present work
provides some consistent flesh to Edelman’s "vague
and utopian" (his own words) remarks:
Physics and biology will “correspond” with
each other in an intimate way, certainly in the
next century and possibly even sooner than
that. [. . . ] Symmetry is a stunning example
of how a rationally derived mathematical argu-
ment can be applied to descriptions of nature
and lead to insights of the greatest generality
(Edelman, 1992, chap.20).
In this perspective, I believe that the notion of
symmetry revitalises and clarifies the long-standing
philosophical debate between realists and their op-
ponents. The notions of “reality”, “being”, “existence”
or even “self” have always been tricky because one
cannot define them without introducing some tautol-
ogy. In the endless controversial discussions about
ontology, these notions are, at best, acknowledged as
primary concepts (Einstein, 1949, pp. 669 and 673,
for instance) and are, therefore, not necessarily un-
derstood or shared in the same way by all the different
schools. Even more, and not only in epistemology but
in the whole philosophy as well, it is quite common
to find arguments for or against realism that presup-
pose the “existence” of what they are supposed to
accept or deny. Indeed, what sense can be given to
an affirmation like “reality does (not) exist” ? In less
caricatured sentences, like “an object is independent
of the subject” or “objective facts are an illusion”, the
meaning of “object”, “subject”, “fact” or even “illusion”
and the use of the verb “to be” reflect some kind of re-
ality (otherwise we fall in a vicious circle, paved with
liar-like paradoxes where illusion is itself an illusion,
etc. This argument is also approved by Fine, 1996,
chap. 7, § 3, first paragraph and discussed by Nozick,
2001, chap. 1).
Aside from practical (“fitted” as Darwin would
have said, “convenient” as Poincaré should have pre-
ferred) everyday life, even an ultra anti-realist like
a solipsist must accept the conclusion of the famous
Descartes’credo “I think, therefore I am”3. Nomina-
lists must accept the existence of equivalence classes
that each word denotes. Agnostic empiricists, phe-
nomenologists, positivists, pragmatists, idealists, etc.
must deal with the existence of facts, sensations,
mental representations and so on. Post-modernists
of every kind use equivalence classes like historical
events, social structures and groups, cultural beliefs,
etc., and whether contingent or not, these classes may
nevertheless become true objects of scientific studies
as soon as they contribute to a rational scheme (the
social or human sciences). As far as rationality is
concerned—and, I would say, by definition of what
rationality means—the best we can do is to remain
at least non self-contradictory, in a virtuous circle
so to speak. My preference in this matters inclines
to distribute the notion of existence into a sort of
holistic web where entities have a more or less high
degree of reality according to how tightly bounded
they are by coherent and logical relations. I will try
to show how the four facets of symmetry, through
the cardinal concept of equivalence classes, help us
to gain in coherence or, at least, help us to anchor
and place in this circle. Anyway, wherever we stand,
an Ouroboros loop remains unavoidable because we,
as intelligent subjects, are fully part of the world and
3I leave as an exercise for the reader to explain, from the
hints given throughout the present article, why it is preferable
to invert the implication and say “I am, therefore I think”.
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may be, therefore, considered as objects of knowledge
as well.
The two oil paintings by René Magritte entitled
“La condition humaine” (the human condition) could
have been chosen to illustrate the complex relation
between real and its representation, but its circularity
is even more admirably rendered by Maurits Cornelis
Escher’s lithography “Prentententoonstelling” (print
gallery, see de Smit and Lenstra (2003).
Of course, I can take on safely all the self-reference
aspects of the present reflections since, as being hope-
fully rational, they are therefore partly recursive (ra-
tional thinking must obviously be broad enough in
scope to embrace the process of rational thinking it-
self): to play with the multiple senses of the word
“reflection” and to use a metaphor borrowed from
laser physics, I hope that, through this paper, some
light will be produced or at least coherently ampli-
fied, like the beam in a resonant optical cavity. This
somehow risky and ambitious attempt to enlighten
different other fields by extrapolating some notions
whose most precise meaning can only be offered by
mathematics and physics was already a strategy pro-
posed by Helmholtz in 1868, according to Cassirer
(1944); the latter analyses carefully the precautions
that must be taken to achieve this goal precisely with
the help of the notion of symmetry.
2 Symmetries, classifications
and hierarchies
The physical meanings of the notion of symmetry will
be our guidelines throughout this essay. However, I
will start by a rather formal considerations where the
physical motivations remain in the background. It is
only from the next sections that I will develop the
physical interpretations and extend to a broader do-
main the matter of the present section. After the first
version of this work was composed I became aware of
Brading and Castellani’s book. The deep connection
between symmetries, classifications and groups that
will be shown in § 2.2 is already present in Gordon
Belot (2003, § 5) and Elena Castellani (2003, § 2)’s
contributions. Some considerations on the three first
facets have already been proposed by van Fraassen
(1989, § X.3).
2.1 The four facets of a symmetry
The oldest known trace of symmetry involved in a
thought process are the engraved pieces of red ochre
found at Blombos Cave in South Africa and are es-
timated to be older than 75,000 years (Henshilwood
et al., 2002, fig. 2). Most likely, we will never know
whether these engravings had a symbolic role or were
a pure aesthetical game. However, historically, the
concept of symmetry was first employed to refer to
an aesthetic harmony made of unity, rhythm or bal-
anced proportions emanating from internal or exter-
nal relations Weyl (1952); Tarasov (1986); Mouchet
(2013b), for instance in a sense exquisitely expressed
by Charles Baudelaire in his famous poem Correspon-
dences.
In a scientific context these associations are for-
mulated with some mappings T , defined on a set E
of elements. A symmetry associated with the set of
mappings T encapsulates four significations that are
more or less clearly distinguished in the literature:
(i). A transformation x 7→ T (x) where we retain the
image xT def= T (x) of an element (or a set of
elements) x by one mapping T belonging to T .
(ii). A comprehension: We retain all the images of x
obtained when applying all the mappings in T
and collect them in the set
σ(x)
def
= {T (x)}T∈T . (1)
When applied to many (and ideally all) elements
of E we can see the mapping x 7→ σ(x) as being
a classification.
(iii). An invariance: Provided T fulfills some con-
ditions that will be specified below, applying
any mapping T of T on any subset of σ gives
again a subset of σ. In the case of a mirror
symmetry for instance, the action of T on the
pair σ(A) = {A,AT} where A is a set of points
of space does not modify σ(A).
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(iv). A projection4 or symmetry breaking: Rather
than dealing with the invariant sets (also called
globally invariant or symmetric sets) σ1, σ2, . . .
we retain only one element for each σ i.e.
x1, x2, . . . such that x1 ∈ σ1, x2 ∈ σ2, . . . For-
mally, we can see the projection as a map-
ping σ 7→ x where an x is chosen to be a rep-
resentative of each σ.
Projection constitutes the inverse operation of
comprehension and rather than the widely acknowl-
edged expression symmetry breaking, it should have
been more precise to talk about invariance breaking.
2.2 Symmetry as a classification tool
and vice versa
Recall that any classification requires the fundamen-
tal mathematical concept of equivalence relation: it
is a binary relation, hereafter denoted by ≡, between
elements of a set E which is, by definition (Bourbaki,
1968, § II.6.1 p. 113 to quote one of the paragons of
structuralist mathematical books),
a) reflexive : every x in E is related to itself, x ≡ x;
b) symmetric5: for all (x, y) in E 2, if x ≡ y then
y ≡ x;
c) transitive (Euclide’s first common notion): for
all (x, y, z) in E 3 if x ≡ y and y ≡ z then x ≡ z.
From a set of mappings T acting on E we can define
x to be related to y if and only if there exists
a mapping T in T such that y = T (x). (2)
Saying that this relation is reflexive means that there
exists a transformation in T for which x is invariant.
A sufficient condition is of course that
a’) T includes the identity mapping.
The symmetry property is fulfilled if
b’) Every mapping is invertible and its inverse must
belong to T .
4Mathematicians would certainly prefer the term “section”,
keeping the term projection to exclusively qualify a mapping
equal to its iterates. They would also talk of “orbit” rather
than of “comprehension”.
5It is not a coincidence if we recover this term here!
Finally, a sufficient condition to have the transitivity
property of the binary relation is the closure property
for T :
c’) The composition T1◦T2 of two mappings belonging
to T remains in T .
Properties a’), b’), c’) are rather intuitive when using
the language of transformations:
a’) Doing nothing is a (somehow trivial) transforma-
tion;
b’) Every transformation can be undone;
c’) Making two successive transformations is a trans-
formation.
Together with the associativity of the composition
law—we always have (T1 ◦ T2) ◦ T3 = T1 ◦ (T2 ◦ T3)—
they define the set T as being a group. The set σ(x)
defined by (1) is called the equivalence class of x and
collects all the elements that are equivalent to x i.e.
related by the equivalence relation.
Summing up, we have seen how symmetry and clas-
sification are intimately related and why the group
structure arises naturally .
Remark: It is conceptually interesting to remark
that not only working with a group of transforma-
tions is sufficient for having a classification, but it
is also a necessary condition in the sense that, given
a classification, we can always construct an ad hoc
group of transformations T such that (2) for the a pri-
ori given equivalence relation (see also van Fraassen,
1989, § X.3). For example we can choose T as the
group generated by all the one-to-one mappings (bi-
jections) that are the identity everywhere but on one
class. There is also the mathematical possibility of
working with a set T that is not a group but for
which (2) is still an equivalence relation. For ins-
tance take for T the set of all mappings Tσ whose
restriction to one class σ is a bijection and that sends
any element belonging to σ′ 6= σ to one chosen repre-
sentative element of σ′. Except for degenerate cases
where there is only one class or when all but one of
them have exactly one element, T does not in gene-
ral possess the closure property, does not contain the
identity and the Tσ are not invertible6. In physics I
do not know any relevant examples of such a situa-
6I am grateful to Emmanuel Lesigne for helping me in clar-
ifying these points.
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tion.
2.3 Hierarchies
The procedure of constructing new mathematical ob-
jects as being equivalence classes is omnipresent in
mathematics. The set of equivalence classes in E con-
structed from the relation ≡ constitutes the so-called
quotient set denoted by E / ≡. Just to give one funda-
mental example: a hierarchy of numbers can precisely
be built with equivalence classes defined at each step
with an appropriate equivalence relation: the rational
numbers being equivalence classes of ordered pairs of
integers7, the real numbers being equivalence classes
of (Cauchy) sequences of rational numbers (and ap-
pear, therefore, as classes constructed from classes),
the unit-modulus numbers can be seen as classes of
real numbers considered as being equivalent if they
differ by an integer multiple of 2π (classes from classes
from classes). More generally, we first define a new
set E ′1 of elements constructed from the elements of E1
and then we classify them in E2 = E ′1/ ≡ using an
equivalence relation ≡ defined in E ′1. Another stan-
dard example is given in Euclidian geometry: E1 is the
set of points, E ′1 = E1 × E1 is the set of ordered pairs
of points and, eventually, vectors appear as equiv-
alence classes of ordered pairs of points, two pairs
of points being equivalent if and only if they form a
parallelogram.
The objects formed this way gain a sort of au-
tonomy with respect to the primitive elements from
which they are built. The different operations or re-
lations that may exist in E1 can be used to define
operations in E2 provided that they do not depend
on the choice of the representative elements in the
classes. Therefore, computations in E2 can often (but
7By the way, in the Frege construction, even natural num-
bers are equivalence classes, namely the equivalence classes of
sets related by one-to-one mappings (Bourbaki, 1968, §§ III.3.1
p. 157 and III.4.1 p. 166). As far as physics is concerned, I will
always stay at the level of “naive” set theory without taking the
subtle precautions which avoid paradoxes à la Russell, in par-
ticular by distinguishing between the so-called proper classes
and sets. Perhaps, category theory should provide a more suit-
able framework, specially if one is akin to structural realism.
As far as logical considerations are concerned, I mention that
I will also take for granted the axiom of choice that allows the
operation of projection.
not always, see the last paragraphs of § 6.1) be done
without any reference to computations at the “lower”
level in E1. To keep working with the same previous
example, in a d-dimensional space, one can add two
vectors using their 2 × d coordinates, not using the
2 × 2 × d numbers that encode the position of each
points of the two representative pairs. Then, when
constructing the upper level E2 the information that
encodes the distinction between all the elements of
a class at the lower level is erased. In other words
the “internal position” of an element in a class has
been made irrelevant or superfluous (Ismael and van
Fraassen, 2003; Castellani, 2003, § 3) as far as the
manipulations of the elements of E2 are concerned.
Moreover, the main motivation of constructing
equivalence classes is to obtain a richer structure.
One can therefore truly speak of mathematical emer-
gence in the sense that we can draw out properties
in E2 that are not relevant for E1. The emergent no-
tions (e.g. continuity or Borel measure) concern the
elements of E2 (e.g. the real numbers) rather than
the elements of E1 (e.g. the integers).
According to the modern conception advo-
cated by Klein, the characteristic properties of
a multiplicity must not be defined in terms of
the elements of which the multiplicity is com-
posed, but solely in terms of the group to which
the multiplicity is related.[. . . ] The real foun-
dation of mathematical certainty lies no longer
in the elements from which mathematics starts
but in the rule by which the elements are re-
lated to each other and reduced to a “unity of
thought” (Cassirer, 1944, § II, pp. 7–8).
3 Transformations
3.1 Active and passive physical inter-
pretations of a transformation
Let us now sew some physical flesh onto the mathe-
matical bones I have introduced in the previous sec-
tion. Let us begin with the first facet. As far as I
know the distinction between passive and active in-
terpretations of a transformation was made explicitly
for the first time by Houtappel, Van Dam andWigner
(1965, § 2.4a). Furthermore I will follow Fonda and
7
1p) Passive a1) Ative 1 a2) Ative 2
MT
MT
M
M
S
M
S
EEE
S
S
T
S
T
Figure 1: Schematic view of the three physical interpretations of a transformation: p) In a passive trans-
formation the same system S is described by two different measurers M and MT . For instance, they use
two kinds of measuring instruments, different gaugings or standards and two different frames of reference to
map the space-time around S. In order to give a sense to “same” and “different” used above, it is necessary
to use an environment E as a reference. In the active points of view S is turned into ST and either M is
transformed accordingly (a1) or remains unchanged (a2).
Ghirardi (1970, § 1.7) and will consider that two ac-
tive points of view can be distinguished. I will em-
phasize that the three physical interpretations of a
transformation require the division of the universe
in three parts, not two: the system S (the object),
the measurer M (the subject, the observer) who de-
scribes quantitatively S with the help of measuring
devices, an environment E made of everything else
and that is necessary to detect whether effectively S
or M have been transformed or not (figure 1). In
a passive transformation, S remains anchored to E
and the measurer is transformed toMT (for instance
the measuring instruments, the reference frame, the
standards are changed). In the active points of view
the system is changed with respect to E (in cosmol-
ogy since, in principle, we consider S = E , the active
points of view are meaningless). Unlike in the first ac-
tive point of view where both M and S are changed,
in the second active point, the observer M remains
unchanged. In the latter,
[The observations are] of the same observer, us-
ing one definite language to characterize his
observations (Houtappel et al., 1965, § 2.4a,
p. 601).
One can find an echo of such different points of view
at the mathematical level. For instance, in differen-
tial geometry, (active) transformations, like parallel
transport, of geometrical objects such as vectors or
forms defined on a manifold are conceptually diffe-
rent from (passive) coordinates changes. However,
in physics (and in all empirical sciences), active and
passive transformations have much stronger concep-
tual differences (§§ 3.2 and 3.3) as well as important
operational differences (§§ 3.4.2 and 3.5).
3.2 Moving the boundaries
Since S and M necessarily interact, the threshold
between them can be a matter of convention: in the
Michelson-Morley experiment, we may decide freely
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if the mirrors of the interferometer are included in S
or in M. As noted by von Neumann (1932/1955,
§ VI.1), this convention is linked to the choice of what
facts are considered to be observed, registered and
acknowledged by M. For instance during an obser-
vation of the Sun,M can consider that he counts the
sunspots directly or, rather, that he counts the dark
spots that appear in the projection screen he uses; he
can measure the degree of excitation of the retina cells
of another human being looking through a telescope
or look on a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
scanner screen the activity of the corresponding brain
areas during the observation. Solving the a priori
ambiguity of what a “direct” observable phenomenon
or a “sense datum” is consists in choosing where we
place, in a whole chain of processes, the border be-
tween S and M that defines the so-called “external
world” (implicitly external to M, for a comment on
this expression see Sankey, 2001, note 3). Conse-
quently, before the interpretation in terms of corre-
lations between data and in terms of concepts forged
to cement them, this operation of cutting the chain
constitutes an unavoidable task of science whose diffi-
culty measures how remote we stand from our human
sensations and from our original evolutionary-shaped
abilities (the so-called intuition or common sense).
The important consequence is that, so far,
we are left without criteria which would enable
us to draw a non-arbitrary line between “ob-
servation” and “theory”. Certainly, we will of-
ten find it convenient to draw such a to-some-
extent-arbitrary line; but its position will vary
widely from context to context [. . . ] But what
ontological ice does a mere methodologically
convenient observational-theoretical dichotomy
cut?
Does an entity attain physical thinghood
and/or “real existence” in one context only to
lose it in another? (Maxwell, 1962, pp. 7–8).
In section § 4.3 below, I will propose an attempt,
based on equivalence classes, to clarify this ontologi-
cal point.
Besides, quantum physics renders these issues more
problematic: since no generally well-accepted quan-
tum theory has been proposed where the unicity of
the result of one measurement emerges from purely
quantum processes, we still do not know how exactly
the transition between quantum systems and classical
measuring apparatus occurs. In the absence of a more
satisfactory solution, we are forced to keep the ortho-
dox approach where Schrödinger equation is replaced
by a discontinuous transition at the very moment of
measurement8. In what follows, since I will not spe-
cially be concerned by these quantum measurement
issues (except in § 6.2), I will not distinguish between
the apparatus that prepares the system and the de-
tectors. Within the very general level of the present
discussion, it is not important to specify which part
of the degrees of freedom belongs to S or to M and
we will not be concerned by their entanglement if any
(the environment E may have disentangled them ac-
cording to the decoherence process). Furthermore, as
noticed by Russell:
There has been a great deal of specula-
tion in traditional philosophy which might have
been avoided if the importance of structure, and
the difficulty of getting behind it, had been
realised. For example, it is often said that
space and time are subjective, but they have
objective counterparts; or that phenomena are
subjective, but are caused by things in them-
selves, which must have differences inter se cor-
responding with the differences in the phenom-
ena to which they give rise. Where such hy-
potheses are made, it is generally supposed that
we can know very little about the objective
counterparts. In actual fact, however, if the
hypotheses as stated were correct, the objec-
tive counterparts would form a world having
the same structure as the phenomenal world,
and allowing us to infer from phenomena the
truth of all propositions that can be stated in
abstract terms and are known to be true of phe-
nomena.[. . . ] In short, every proposition hav-
ing a communicable significance must be true
8In the last decades, significant progress have been made
both theoretically and experimentally which focus on the
role played by the environment during quantum evolution.
Among the ocean of bibliographic references on this sub-
ject, let us mention Wheeler and Zurek (1983); Presilla et al.
(1996); Breuer and Petruccione (2002); Giulini et al. (2003);
Schlosshauer (2007); Barchielli and Gregoratti (2009) and their
references. However, I think the central problem of quantum
measurement discussed in § 6.2 still remains.
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of both worlds or of neither. (Russell, 1919,
chap. VI, p. 61).
I will therefore not consider the separation between S
andM to be of metaphysical origin and I will not en-
dorse any kind of genuine dualism nor pluralism but
prefer a realistic (materialistic) monism: The separa-
tion between S and E (that demarcates the pertinent
parameters from the irrelevant ones) together with
the separation between M and S consist not only
of blurred but above all of movable boundaries that
must be moved to check the consistency of our line
of reasoning (for an interesting proposal that trends
to reinforce the conception of a unified ontology, see
Clark, 2008). For instance, when the effects of the
coupling to the environment are under the scope, this
may be implemented by splitting S in two: a subsys-
tem coupled to a bath that furnishes a reduced model
of the “exterior”.
Where does that crude reality, in which the
experimentalist lives, end, and where does the
atomistic world, in which the idea of reality
is illusion and anathema begin ? There is, of
course, no such border; if we are compelled to
attribute reality to the ordinary things of every-
day life including scientific instruments and ma-
terials used in experimenting, we cannot cease
doing so for objects observable only with the
help of instruments. To call these subjects real
and part of the external world does not, how-
ever, commit us in any way to any definite de-
scription: a thing may be real though very dif-
ferent from other things we know. [. . . ]
The boundary between the action of the
subject and the reaction of the object is blurred
indeed. But this does not prohibit us from us-
ing these concepts in a reasonable way. The
boundary of a liquid and its vapour is also not
sharp, as their atoms are permanently evapo-
rating and condensing. Still we can speak of
liquid and vapour9 (Born, 1953).
Indeed, since Samuel Johnson’s refutation of Berke-
ley’s extreme idealism—obtained by merely “striking
9No doubt that Born was also aware that one can bypass
the coexistence curve and circumvent the critical point in the
pressure-temperature diagram by continuously connecting the
liquid phase with vapour while remaining at the macroscopic
scale all the way around.
his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till
he rebounded from it”(Boswell, 1791/2008, 6 august
1763)—, the possibility of action on the world has
always been an insight of what reality means. Active
and passive transformation just help to extend, pre-
cise and formalise this common sense (by the way, the
use of the word “common” in this expression already
bears the notion of invariance).
3.3 Reproducibility and objectivity
On the one hand, active points of view are at work
when one wants to put to the test the reproducibil-
ity of an experiment. Galilei’s ship (1632/1981, 2nd
day, 317)—see also its inspiring predecessors like
Bruno’s ship thought experiment (1584/1995, third
dialogue) borrowed from an older argument used by
Cusa (1440/1985, II.12, p. 111)—is probably the
most famous and, in a historical perspective, cer-
tainly the most crucial illustration of a (first) active
transformation. An example, among many others,
of the second active point of view can be found in
Gibbs’interpretation of a thermodynamical ensemble
where we consider “a great number of independent
systems” (Gibbs, 1902/2010, chap. I, p. 5 and the
preface). As usual in classical pre-twentieth century
tradition, the reference to any subject M is implicit
because it is considered as being irrelevant (one no-
ticeable exception being discussions on the Maxwell’s
demon).
Of course, from one experiment to another, time
may have evolved. This is reflected in (or equiva-
lent to) many transformations that occurred in the
environment E . Whether the experiment is actually
reproducible or not will be a hint on the relevance of
the part of the universe we have decided to consider
as the system S.
On the other hand, the passive point of view puts
to the test the intersubjectivity of an observation and
therefore paves the road to objectivity (see Nozick’s
2001, chap. 2, p. 91). An invariance under a passive
transformation reveals or defines an entity as being
(at least approximately) independent ofM. To which
extent this autonomy appears, and more generally
the degree of reality of S, is reflected in the nature of
the group of transformations T for which invariance
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occurs.
Before I specify T in the next subsection, from
what precedes we can already see how a bridge can be
established between two main principles of the scien-
tific method, reproducibility and objectivity: for this
purpose, symmetry is the appropriate tool (we shall
come back on this point below).
3.4 Relevant groups of transforma-
tions
Up to now, the strong affinity between classification
and transformations which was shown in § 2.2 may
appear of shallow interest to the physicist. Actually,
one can classify anything with anything or even trans-
form anything to anything else. When a property P is
given a priori “Having the same property P as” defines
automatically an equivalence relation and the corre-
sponding equivalence classes for which P is an invari-
ant; reversely, if a partition of a set is given, the pro-
perty P can always be identified with the membership
to a subset and the equivalence relation defined as
“belongs to the same subset as”. The transformations
that are most pertinent are those that can be applied
to a wide range of entities while keeping simple rules,
that is, defined with less information than the set of
elements they act on (we will come back in § 4.5.2 to
the reduction of information provided by any classi-
fication and therefore any symmetry). A reversible
transformation that turns a pumpkin into a coach,
whether it concerns the three-dimensional objects or
a morphing between two-dimensional images, must
encapsulate the huge amount of information than en-
codes the pumpkin and the coach; it can hardly be
applied to anything else without artificially introduc-
ing some additional ad hoc information. This is why,
scientifically speaking, such a transformation is far
less interesting than a rotation or a dilatation.
3.4.1 Algebraic representations
Indeed, the relevant groups of transformations that
are considered in physics have been abstracted in-
dependently of the elements that are transformed.
For instance, the usual transformations like space-
translations or rotations have their roots in our intu-
itive geometrical conception of the three-dimensional
space; yet, in mathematical physics, they have now
acquired the status of an “abstract” group SO(3) that
can be represented in many ways: they do not ap-
ply to three-dimensional geometrical objects only but
also to a huge collection of mathematical objects
living in much more abstract spaces (specially the
quantum states and operators). Figure 2 provides a
schematic view of what an algebraic representation
of an abstract group is. The theory of abstract group
and their representations constitutes a whole domain
of algebra and mathematical physics (among many
treatises, see for instance Cornwell, 1984; Sternberg,
1994 or Jones, 1998. The special status of linear rep-
resentations in quantum physics can be traced back
to a theorem due to Wigner in the early 30’s, see the
references of Simon et al, 2008 and Mouchet 2013a.).
G
E
E Tg
g
Figure 2: Schematic view of the algebraic representa-
tion of an abstract group G in a set of elements E . To
each element g in G is associated a transformation Tg
acting on the elements of E .
Many abstract symmetry groups have been shown
to be relevant for the six purposes 1◦–6◦ listed in
§ 1. Let us direct our attention to several substantial
extensions that go far beyond the set of pure spatial
isometries:
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Evolution: First, the time evolution must be con-
sidered as a transformation10. This strengthens
the interpretation of the transformation in terms
of reproducibility since the latter concerns space-
translations as well as time-translations. This is also
in accordance with Einsteinian relativity that treats
on an almost equal footing time and space.
Transformations mixing space and time: Sec-
ond, in accordance with Galileo’s ship argument, we
can also include dynamical transformations corre-
sponding to translations at constant speed (the trans-
formation of spatial positions depends on time). Ge-
neral relativity incorporates any smooth transforma-
tion mixing space and time. Canonical formalism
allows for even more general transformations invol-
ving mixture of spatio-temporal coordinates and mo-
menta.
Exchange of particles: As suggested first by
Heisenberg (1926, 1927, in particular eq. 8) and
Dirac (1926), the permutations (or “substitutions”)
of a finite number of elements (for which the term
of “group” was originally coined by Galois in 1830)
appeared of crucial importance for describing quan-
tum collective effects of indistinguishable particles.
Later on, Heisenberg (1932) considered the exchange
of non-identical particles, namely protons and neu-
trons, to describe the spectral properties of nuclei.
Another important example of transformations in-
volving changes of particles goes back to Dirac’s 1930
seminal work that led to the charge conjugation sym-
metry (for instance, see Yang, 1994) where particles
may be substituted with their antiparticles. Even
though there is still no experimental evidence of its
relevance, since the 1970’s, the transmuting of bosons
into fermions and conversely have been introduced in
several particle and string models. This concept of
supersymmetry is an attempt to tackle some prob-
lems raised by the Standard Model (Weinberg, 2000,
§ 24.2), (Binétruy, 2006, chap. 1).
10Technically, if we are to describe irreversible processes we
can relax b’) in § 2.2 and work with a so-called semigroup.
Gauge transformations: Field theories that de-
scribe local interactions in condensed matter or in
high energy physics, may require the introduction of
some mathematical ingredients whose choice, in a fi-
nite portion of space-time, is, to a large extent, a
matter of convention. A gauge transformation repre-
sents a change of convention and is, by definition of
what a convention means, not expected to have any
observable influence. Looking systematically for the
effects of these transformations on the mathemati-
cal ingredients of a model provides sufficiently con-
strained guidelines to select the physically relevant
descriptions. There is no need to insist any longer on
the efficiency of such constructions throughout the
twentieth century, from the elaboration of general re-
lativity and Weyl’s first attempts starting in 1918, to
Yang and Mills (1954) non-commutative gauge model
and beyond. Among the vast literature on the subject
see, for instance, Moriyasu (1983) for a nice introduc-
tion.
3.4.2 Operational differences between active
and passive transformations
All the transformations described above have been
upgraded into abstract groups and can be alge-
braically represented within the different species
of the mathematical ingredients of various physical
models. However, if some transformations can be
indifferently interpreted in both passive and active
point of view, this is far from being the case for all
of them.
Precisely because gauge transformations fulfill
their constructive role when they have no detectable
consequences, they can only be interpreted as pas-
sive transformations (Brading and Brown, 2004, and
its references). The same situation occurs in classi-
cal mechanics: after a relevant canonical transforma-
tion that interweaves them, the dynamical variables
may loose the empirical interpretation they had be-
fore being transformed (say, the positions and veloc-
ities of the planets when blended into action-angle
variables). Therefore, such transformations appear
clearly as a change of description of the dynamics
rather than an active transformation of the system.
Examples of active (resp. passive) transformations
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that cannot naturally be considered from the passive
(resp. active) point of view are given by transforma-
tions associated with an exchange, addition or sub-
traction of some constituents of the system (resp. the
measuring device). If we are ready to accept a per-
mutation between quantum particles as a candidate
for being in T , why should we not consider also the
replacement of a spring in a mechanical apparatus or
the modification of the wavelength of a probe? Even
though, these kinds of transformations are never (as
far as I know) considered when talking about symme-
try, this is precisely invariance with respect to them,
as being discussed in § 5 below, that allows eventually
to establish stable and universal laws. In practise,
when attempting to reproduce an old or a remote
experiment, the experimental set up is rarely moved
but rather completely rebuilt from new materials.
3.5 Perception of space-time trans-
formations: following Henri
Poincaré’s intuitions
In fact, a way of understanding which mathemati-
cal transformations can be interpreted both passively
and actively was presented more a century ago by
Poincaré (1895; 1903, § 5) when analysing carefully
our intuition of three-dimensional space (his consid-
erations can be applied to a large extent to the four-
dimensional space-time). He introduced a distinction
that Einstein would sum up four decades after him:
Poincaré has justly emphasized the fact that
we distinguish two kinds of alterations of the
bodily object, “changes of state" and “changes
of position." The latter, he remarked, are alter-
ations which we can reverse by arbitrary mo-
tions of our bodies (Einstein, 1936, § 2, pp. 354–
355).
However, what does not appear clearly in this re-
port (but was criticised by Einstein elsewhere, for
instance in his 1949, p. 677 reply) is that, according
to Poincaré, this is a matter of definition or conven-
tion:
Thence comes a new distinction among ex-
ternal changes: those which may be so cor-
rected we call changes of position; and the
others, changes of state (Poincaré, 1903, § 5,
I underline).
For Poincaré, the possible compensation of an ac-
tive transformation by a passive one is therefore in-
timately linked with our perception of space.
For a being completely immovable there
would be neither space nor geometry; in vain
would exterior objects be displaced about him,
the variations which these displacements would
make in his impressions would not be attributed
by this being to changes in position, but to
simple changes of state; this being would have
no means of distinguishing these two sorts of
changes, and this distinction, fundamental for
us, would have no meaning for him (Poincaré,
1903, § 5).
However, following Galileo’s conception of uni-
form speed, Poincaré was aware that transforma-
tions could not be considered absolutely and, as soon
as 1902, he clearly formulated in chap. V, § V, of
Science and Hypothesis a “relativity law”. The trans-
formations must be anchored somewhere: this is pre-
cisely the main reason why we must introduce the
environment E as a background and that Einstein
(1936, § 2, p. 354) would call a “bodily object”. Other-
wise, the first active point of view would be unde-
tectable and the distinction between the passive and
the second active point of view would be meaningless.
Extending an old argument going back to Laplace
(according to Jammer, 1994, chap. 5, pp. 168–169),
Poincaré not only discusses the case of a uniform ex-
pansion of the universe but also considers any conti-
nuous change of coordinates:
But more; worlds will be indistinguishable
not only if they are equal or similar, that is, if
we can pass from one to the other by changing
the axes of coordinates, or by changing the scale
to which lengths are referred; but they will still
be indistinguishable if we can pass from one to
the other by any ‘point transformation’ what-
ever. [. . . ] The relativity of space is not ordi-
narily understood in so broad a sense; it is thus,
however, that it would be proper to understand
it (Poincaré, 1903, § 1).
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Poincaré considers that only topological structures—
being unaffected by homeomorphisms—are physi-
cally relevant. For him the choice of differential
structure, in particular through the metric, is a mat-
ter of convention similar to a choice of units or a
choice of language. The imprint of curvature in the
sum of the angles of a triangle or on the ratio between
the perimeter of a circle and its radius can always be
rectified empirically.
Think of a material circle, measure its ra-
dius and circumference, and see if the ratio of
the two lengths is equal to pi . What have we
done? We have made an experiment on the
properties of the matter with which this round-
ness has been realized, and of which the mea-
sure we used is made (Poincaré, 1952, chap. V,
§ 2).
and also
The same question may also be asked in an-
other way. If Lobatschewsky’s geometry is true,
the parallax of a very distant star will be finite.
If Riemann’s is true, it will be negative. These
are the results which seem within the reach of
experiment, and it is hoped that astronomical
observations may enable us to decide between
the two geometries. But what we call a straight
line in astronomy is simply the path of a ray of
light. If, therefore, we were to discover nega-
tive parallaxes, or to prove that all parallaxes
are higher than a certain limit, we should have
a choice between two conclusions: we could give
up Euclidean geometry, or modify the laws of
optics, and suppose that light is not rigorously
propagated in a straight line. It is needless to
add that every one would look upon this solu-
tion as the more advantageous. Euclidean geo-
metry, therefore, has nothing to fear from fresh
experiments (Poincaré, 1891).
Albeit historical development of the theory of grav-
itation has refuted Poincaré’s opinion that
Euclidean geometry is, and will remain, the
most convenient: 1st, because it is the sim-
plest, and it is not so only because of our men-
tal habits or because of the kind of direct in-
tuition that we have of Euclidean space; it is
the simplest in itself, just as a polynomial of
the first degree is simpler than a polynomial of
the second degree; 2nd, because it sufficiently
agrees with the properties of natural solids,
those bodies which we can compare and mea-
sure by means of our senses (Poincaré, 1891).
when gravitation was formulated as a gauge theory
by Utiyama (1956), then working either with Euclid-
ian/Minkowskian or Riemannian geometry appeared
indeed to be a conventional choice. See Carnap (1966,
chaps. 15–17), Stump (1991) or Hacyan (2009) for
a more detailed discussion on these issues. (Even if
we put aside the topological properties of space-time,
like worm-holes at large scales or any kind of topolog-
ical defect that may have physical observable conse-
quences which would definitely rule out Minkowskian
geometry, some general arguments on causality still
favour a curved space-time interpretation, Penrose
(1980)).
Even if we keep sticking to Riemannian geometry,
we can remark that a confusion remains that ob-
scures the debate between realists and convention-
alists (or their relativist post-modern successors). A
representation (here a choice of one coordinate map)
is always, obviously, a matter of convention (it fixes
a gauge); however, when quotienting all the equiva-
lent descriptions obtained one from each other by a
transformation (the change of coordinates), we can
abstract geometrical objects with intrinsic properties
(the Riemannian manifold itself and the tensors de-
fined on it). Formally from a set of quantities indexed
by coordinates labels, say vµ, whose values change
when changing the coordinates from (xµ)µ to (xµT )µ,
vµT =
∂xµT
∂xν
vν , (3)
an abstract object can be defined, the tangent vec-
tor v, which is independent of the precise choice of
coordinates. While the coordinates (3) are said to
be co-variant under the (passive) transformation that
changes the coordinates, the vector v remains insen-
sitive to it. Besides, to emphasize the intrinsic char-
acter of the construction, rather than starting from
the transformation rule (3), a vector at a point x
is preferably defined in differential geometry, as be-
ing an equivalence class of tangent differential curves
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on the manifold passing through x (Choquet-Bruhat
and DeWitt-Morette, 1982, chap, III, B.1, pp. 120–
121). This geometrisation procedure was the core of
Klein’s Erlanger program (1893, see Cassirer, 1944,
for a historical account on the connections between a
group of geometrical transformations, perception, in-
variance and objectivity. See also the excerpts given
above in § 2.3 and below in § 5) and one of the fa-
thers of the modern notion of symmetry was already
aware of its physical connection with objectivity (for
a recent survey, see Kosso, 2003, § 2):
Without claiming to give a mechanically ap-
plicable criterion, our description bears out the
essential fact that objectivity is an issue de-
cidable on the ground of experience only.[. . . ]
Whereas the philosophical question of objectiv-
ity is not easy to answer in a clear and definite
fashion, we know exactly what the adequate
mathematical concepts are for the formulation
of this idea.[. . . ] The pure mathematician will
say: Given a group G of transformations in a
field of symbols, a geometry is established by
agreeing to study, and consider as objective,
only such relations in that field as are invariant
under the transformations of G (Weyl, 1949,
§ 13, pp. 72 and 77).
Perhaps the philosophically most relevant
feature of modern science is the emergence of
abstract symbolic structures as the hard core
of objectivity behind—as Eddington puts it—
the colourful tale of the subjective storyteller
mind (Weyl, 1949, Appendix B, § 1, p. 237).
and also
But I preferred the name of automorphisms
[. . . ], defining them with Leibniz as those trans-
formations which leave the structure of space
unchanged.[. . . ]
We found that objectivity means invariance
with respect to the group of automorphisms.
Reality may not always give a clear answer to
the question what the actual group of automor-
phisms is, and for the purpose of some investi-
gations it may be quite useful to replace it by a
wider group. For instance in plane geometry we
may be interested only in such relations [that]
are invariant under parallel or central projec-
tions; this is the origin of affine and projec-
tive geometry. The mathematician will prepare
for all such eventualities by posing the general
problem, how for a given group of transforma-
tions to find its invariants (invariant relations,
invariant quantities, etc.), and by solving it for
the more important special groups—whether
these groups are known or are not known to be
the groups of automorphisms for certain fields
suggested by nature. This is what Felix Klein
called "a geometry" in the abstract sense. A
geometry, Klein said, is defined by a group
of transformations, and investigates everything
that is invariant under the transformations of
this given group (Weyl, 1952, chap. II, p. 42
and chap. IV, pp. 132–133).
Poincaré’s conventionalism far from being anti-
thetic to objectivity (see Giedymin, 1982, 1992) ap-
pears to be a necessary condition for the latter:
Now the possibility of translation implies
the existence of an invariant. To translate is
precisely to disengage this invariant.[. . . ]
What is objective must be common to many
minds and consequently transmissible from one
to the other, and this transmission can only
come about by [a] “discourse” [. . . ] we are even
forced to conclude: no discourse, no objectivity.
[. . . ]
Now what is science? I have explained
[above], it is before all a classification, a manner
of bringing together facts which appearances
separate, though they were bound together by
some natural and hidden kinship. Science, in
other words, is a system of relations. Now we
have just said, it is in the relations alone that
objectivity must be sought; it would be vain to
seek it in beings considered as isolated from one
another.
To say that science cannot have objective
value since it teaches us only relations, this is
to reason backwards, since, precisely, it is rela-
tions alone which can be regarded as objective.
External object, for instance, for which the
word object was invented, are really objects and
not fleeting and fugitive appearances, because
they are not only groups of sensations, but
groups cemented by a constant bond. It is this
bond, and this bond alone, which is the object
in itself, and this bond is a relation (Poincaré,
1902, §§4 and 6, I underline).
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The concept of symmetry allows to give a quan-
titative meaning to the terms used in this remark-
able text: “Relations” and “classification” have al-
ready been discussed in § 2.2. “Translation” (not
taken here to synonymous of a shift!) appears to be a
passive transformation in the sense considered in sec-
tion § 3.1, and its relation with objectivity has been
emphasized in § 3.3; “object” being considered as an
equivalence class, an “invariant”. Whereas “discourse”
(we have seen above that Houtappel et al. also use
the term “language”) corresponds to a choice of con-
vention (but, of course, Poincaré is far from endorsing
nominalism, see § 4 of his 1902 reflexions), a coordi-
nate chart in differential geometry or more generally
a representative of an equivalence class, that “breaks”
the symmetry (or, rather, the invariance).
4 Comprehension and classifica-
tion
Poincaré’s last remark on the importance of classifi-
cation and its role in identifying invariants leads us to
focus on the second facet of the concept of symmetry.
Comprehension is an old scholastic notion and it
is not by chance that the same word is used to mean
the act of comprehending and the act of understand-
ing. The latter requires to find analogies11, correla-
tions, regularities between a priori distinct entities or
phenomena; these connections are the most precisely
expressed by equivalence relations (incidentally, re-
latives constitute the fourth Aristotelian category;
Aristotle 1938, § IV, pp. 16–17) which are synony-
mous, as we have seen, of classification and therefore
of unification. The common qualities shared by the
elements of one class are the invariants and allow to
define them by intension rather than by extension.
The duality between a class and its elements reacti-
vates, to use a terminology with some medieval taste,
the old opposition between universals and individu-
als.
11See Kant (1781/1998, I, 2nd part Transcendendal logic,
1st division, book II, chap. II, § III.3, Analogies of experience)
and Cournot (1851/1956, chap. IV § 49).
4.1 From taxonomy to predictability
We do not have to probe very deeply to acknowledge
the major role of taxonomy in science. Far from being
a purely descriptive tool, sorting things out is above
all relevant when it reveals some objective proper-
ties, as Poincaré explains in the last quotation given
above. In biology, for instance, the hierarchical clas-
sification initiated by Carl Linnaeus which were origi-
nally based on phenotype only, allowed to reveal some
correlations that could be explained within the gene-
ral scheme of the theory of evolution12. The degree of
similarity between some physical or even behavioural
characteristics of living organisms have been a rele-
vant indicator of the chronology of the divergence be-
tween species. Even before the genetic distance was
even conceived and before phylogenetics, these cor-
relations could be associated (through correlations of
correlations, so to speak) to the history of our planet
(climate fluctuations, atmosphere composition, con-
tinental drifts, etc).
Another example is provided by the appropri-
ate way of classifying chemical elements which led
Mendeleev to some successful predictions on the
properties of elements that were yet unknown in 1869.
Without knowing the atomic structure (at an epoch
where only few physicists accepted the existence of
atoms), this periodic classification exhibits some uni-
versal characteristics that were not undermined by
the subsequent improvements of the physical theo-
ries and the numerous models of the atoms that came
with them (first classical, like Kelvin’s vortex atoms
in 1867 and later on, of course, the quantum models).
During the second half of the twentieth century,
symmetry has strengthened its classificatory and pre-
dictive role. Originated in the 1930’s by Wigner—
who received in 1963 the Nobel price in physics
precisely “for his contributions to the theory of the
atomic nucleus and the elementary particles, parti-
cularly through the discovery and application of fun-
damental symmetry principles"—our modern classi-
fication of quantum particles, whether there are sup-
posed to be elementary or not, relies on the classifica-
12More generally, the role played by symmetries is of the
greatest importance in all hierarchy-based philosophies, parti-
cularly in Cournot’s 1861, book IV, chap. XIV, § 514.
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tion of the (linear) algebraic representations (in the
sense defined in § 3.4.1) of groups like the Poincaré
group (Wigner’s philosophical reflections on symme-
try are collected in his 1995 book. For a modern
presentation of technical details see Weinberg, 1995,
chap. 2). Unlike taxonomy of macroscopic objects,
the classification of quantum particles relies on a
very few parameters only, like the mass, the elec-
tric charge, the spin. The reason is that in quantum
physics only very few observables are compatible with
all the others (technically, those associated with op-
erators that commute with all the others, which are
associated with the so-called superselection rules).
Otherwise, an observed property is generically com-
pletely erased by the measurement of an incompatible
observable: quantum particles have no history nor ac-
cidents and quantum field theory naturally incorpo-
rates the indistinguishability of the particles belong-
ing to the same class. Anyway, the hadron classifica-
tion leading to the prediction of the Ω− or the predic-
tion of the existence of particles like the W±, Z0 or
the Higgs boson in the Standard Model are all built
on symmetry arguments (more specifically on the ba-
sis of a symmetry breaking argument). These provide
another illustration, like in Mendeleev’s contribution,
that the possibility of classification is a signature of
an objective reality, the latter being taken in the sense
given by Poincaré in the last quotation. In the same
time, this classification often reveals a substructure
(the periodic table reflects the atomic structure, the
“eightfold way” to classify the hadrons reflects the
quark structure and maybe the quark and leptons
classification reflects a still unknown subworld).
4.2 Inference and the problem of
change
Since any time-translation can be considered as a
particular case of symmetry transformation (§ 3.4),
the foresight skills conferred by evolution equations
(whether classical or quantum) appear as the most
important aspects of the predictive power provided
by symmetry. Obviously, this ability of anticipation
covers fields much broader than science. There is
no need to solve differential equations to successfully
forecast that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Af-
ter having closed your eyes, you know with almost
certainty that you will find the words you are cur-
rently reading in the same order once you look again
on this page. There is no miracle here (Putnam, 1975,
chap. 4, p. 73), just a consistency for rational think-
ing, a raison d’être: no thoughts, no language could
be possible if we were unable to discern some “cons-
tant bond” as Poincaré wrote. These stable proper-
ties (at least for a moment long enough to be no-
ticeable) reveal what we call the existence of things,
building up together what we call the real world (in-
cluding ourselves, see for instance Mach, 1906/1976,
chap. XXV, ß 14, 17). A macroscopic object like a
cherry can be considered as an equivalence class asso-
ciated with properties (shape, taste, colour, size, etc.)
that remain invariant despite the change of light, the
endless adsorption or desorption of molecules (active
transformations in the sense explained in § 3.1) or the
(passive) transformations of the spatial position of
the measurer or of his neural states. As remarked by
Heisenberg (1958, chap. IV) or Popper (1969, chap. 5,
§ IX), this “problem of change” (or of becoming) has
already been settled by pre-Athenian philosophers
among which Heraclitus and Parmenides, who pro-
posed the two most extreme solutions along the whole
continuous spectrum of possible answers.
We will come back in section 5 to the notion of
invariance, which constitutes the third facet of sym-
metry. However, at this stage, we can usefully notice
that symmetry as a predictive tool provides an in-
termediate support for the inductive/deductive infer-
ence. Induction, as a reasoning from a part to a whole
is formally described by the operation x 7→ σ(x)
while deduction, processing from general to partic-
ular instances, offers a second look at the fourth
facet of symmetry, formally described by the opera-
tion σ 7→ x.
4.3 Stability and abstraction
As analysed by Taine 150 years ago, any intelli-
gent being is characterised by his ability of construc-
ting a representation of the world (see also Cournot,
1851/1956, chap. VII, § 109):
Thus, every normal sensation corresponds
to some external fact which it transcribes with
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greater or less approximation, and whose in-
ternal substitute it is. By this correspondence,
internal events agree with external, and sensa-
tions, which are the elements of our ideas, find
themselves naturally and beforehand adjusted
to things, which adjustment will, further on, en-
able our ideas to be in conformity with things,
and consequently true. On the other hand, we
have seen that images are substitutes for sensa-
tions, past, future, or possible, that individual
names are substitutes for images and sensations
momentarily absent, that the more simple gene-
ral names are substitutes for images and impos-
sible sensations, that the more complex general
names are substitutes for other names, and so
on. It seems then that nature has undertaken
to provide in us representatives of her events,
and has effected her purpose in the most eco-
nomical way. She has provided, first, the sen-
sation which translates the fact with more or
less precision and delicacy; then, the surviving
sensation capable of indefinite revival, that is to
say, the image, which repeats the sensation, and
consequently translates the fact itself; then, the
name, a sensation or image of a particular kind,
which, by virtue of its acquired properties, rep-
resents the general character of many similar
facts, and replaces the impossible images and
sensations which would be necessary to trans-
late this isolated character. By means of this
correspondence, of this repetition, and this re-
placement, external facts, present, past, future,
special, general, simple, or complex, have their
internal representatives, and this mental rep-
resentative is always the same internal event,
more or less compounded, repeated, and dis-
guised. (Taine, 1872, end of book III, chap. II,
§ V, p. 141-142).
This correspondence between the world and a men-
tal representation13 is necessarily partial not only be-
cause a brain, as a tiny part of the universe, can only
13Not surprisingly there is an abundant literature that dis-
cusses the congruence between objects and beliefs since it de-
termines the nature of truth. As old as western philosophy
itself, this subject is omnipresent in logic, in linguistic, in psy-
chology, in jurisprudence, in epistemology etc. If we are ready
to move the boundaries as suggested in § 3.2, the traditional
opposition between coherence and correspondence theory of
truth should be softened (see also the discussion in Weyl, 1949,
§ 17, p. 117).
encode far less information than the universe itself
(James, 1880), but also for the sake of the efficiency
that enforces its own stability as an organised struc-
ture, as needed by Darwinian competitive selection
(Popper, 1979, § 2.16; Dawkins, 1976, chap. 4; Den-
nett, 1996, chap. 4). The processing of information—
memorising, learning, anticipating—by any intelli-
gent entity cannot be done without a discrimination
between relevant and irrelevant parameters (by the
way, the famous Wisconsin card sorting test allows
neuropsychologists to quantify the adoption of classi-
fication rules and measure its flexibility by trial and
error, see for instance § 6.5, p. 412 of Baars and Gage,
2010).
Ireneo Funes, the character dreamt by Jorge Luis
Borges, whose memory was rigorously infallible,
was almost incapable of general, platonic
ideas. It was not only difficult for him to un-
derstand that the generic term dog embraced so
many unlike specimens of differing sizes and dif-
ferent forms; he was disturbed by the fact that
a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should
have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen
(seen from the front) (Borges, 1942, Funes, the
memorious, p. 114).
He who cannot forget cannot generalise; he who
cannot generalise cannot think. Classification ap-
pears therefore as a fundamental thought process
and hence has been the subject of a wide field of
research in cognitive sciences where the synonym
“categorisation” is usually preferred (Rosch, 1978,
Smith, 1998; Murphy, 2002, chap. 7; Machery, 2009,
chap. 6, for recent surveys of this matter). Abstrac-
tion, forging concepts, using a language, construc-
ting models and eventually building up theories are
variations on the same theme, namely, the second
facet of symmetry. Observation itself appears to be
an act of abstraction—actually the lowest level of
abstraction— inconceivable without entities, the so-
called observable entities, that are indeed concepts
(Duhem, 1906/1954, part 2, chap. IV, §§ 1,2 and
chap. VI, § 1) emerging when pruning the informa-
tion out of a bunch of data extracted from a magma
of occurrences. Following Hanson (1958, chap. 1,
§ C) and talking about theory-laden observations is
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therefore awkward, unless we differentiate between
multiple levels of abstraction, because it supposes a
theory-independent core to be loaded and, thus, this
leads immediately to a self-contradiction since this
core appears to be an abstract notion in itself. In
that sense, in my criticism of empiricism, I am going
further than Hanson and according to Sellars (1956)
I would rather prefer talking about the “myth of the
given”.
In sum, facts are facts, and if it happens that
they satisfy a prediction, this is not an effect of
our free activity. There is no precise frontier
between the fact in the rough and the scientific
fact; it can only be said that such an enuncia-
tion of fact is more crude or, on the contrary,
more scientific than such another (Poincaré,
1902, § 3).
De facto, the degree of precision of any classifica-
tion depends on the criteria we retain. Fruits can be
classified according to the kind of desserts you can
make with or according to the genome of its plant.
Stars can be grouped in constellations or in galaxies
(Cournot, 1851/1956, chap. XI, § 161). The crite-
ria are always moving, are often arbitrary or contin-
gent and maybe difficult to define without referring
to the category itself: the most efficient way to ex-
plain to a child what a cherry is remains to show him
several examples of this fruit, not to give a defini-
tion (Poincaré, 1903, § 4). This intuitive approach is
all the more natural than brains are instinctively in-
clined to think in terms of associations that nurture
its creativity (Hadamard, 1954; Weil, 1960, for ins-
tance). Unlike computers, brains are analogue and
selectionist rather that digital and instructionist de-
vices (Popper, 1978, p. 346; Edelman 1992, specially
the critical postscript, Dehaene, 1997, specially the
chap. 9). The reluctance of being classified offered
by certain elements requires reflection, testifies the
weakness of our comprehension and gives evidence
of the rich variety and of the impermanence of the
world. A thing or a word can come with many varia-
tions of significations, without which there cannot be
nuances, ambiguities, metaphors and even poetry.
But unlike art, rational thinking and, consequently,
its most elaborated form that science represents,
tends to sharpen and perennialise the boundaries
of the equivalence classes; it brings out criteria of
truth beyond cultural barriers and socio-historical
context. This strategy allows to reach provinces far
away from our natural (i.e. adequate from an evo-
lutionary point of view) narrow county and, as we
have seen in the previous section, to make predictions
(Llinás, 2001, specially chap. 2). I have already men-
tioned (§ 2.3) the hierarchy of numbers in mathema-
tics; it extends the concept of numbers much further
than the primitive mental representations of integers,
genetically encoded with a broad brush in highest
mammal brains (Dehaene, 1997; Butterworth, 1999).
In physics, the both prominent frameworks of gene-
ral relativity and quantum theory constitute charts
at scales considerably much wider than our every-
day life environment. If we adopt the adequation I
propose between existence and equivalence classes,
the questions of knowing if we invent or rather dis-
cover these provinces, if symmetry unveils or sculp-
tures reality, appear to be unessential (see also Mar-
golis and Laurence, 2007); it is a matter of taste
depending on where we prefer to observe the virtu-
ous circle (for a particularly interesting examination
of this old subject, namely the “reality of abstrac-
tions”, see Cournot, 1851/1956, chap. XI, specially
the arguments in §§ 152 and 155). In addition, this
orientation also allows to soften the question of the
adequacy between the mathematical world and the
physical world: if we merge these two worlds then
the effectiveness of mathematics does not appear as
an unreasonable miracle (Wigner, 1960) but it is still
true that it is puzzling to see how far this fitness can
spread.
4.4 Different levels of Darwinian se-
lection
The segmentation of the world in equivalence sym-
metry classes, and the drawing of more or less fuzzy
boundaries between them (the most fundamental be-
ing the partition inM, S and E as explained in §§ 3.1
and 3.2), can be seen as a selection process. Jacques
Hadamard (1954, first note of chap. III, p. 29) re-
calls that the Latin original meaning of intelligence
is “selecting among” (inter-legere) and echoes the
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Poincaré’s statement:
What, in fact, is mathematical discovery?
It does not consist in making new combina-
tions with mathematical entities that are al-
ready known. That can be done by any one, and
the combinations that can be so formed would
be infinite in number, and the greater part of
them would be absolutely devoid of interest.
Discovery consists precisely in not constructing
useless combinations, but in constructing those
that are useful, which are an infinitely small
minority. Discovery is discernment, selection
(Poincaré, 1908).
It is of course Darwin’s major contribution to have
shown how differential survival governs the evolution
of living species. This natural selective stabilisation
is a (non-linear) mechanism at work in many other
dynamical systems made of different entities whose
populations are susceptible of attenuation and ampli-
fication (via reproduction, replication, combinations,
etc.). It would be too long a digression, and beyond
my competence, to examine the subtle distinctions of
how Darwinian selection is implemented in so various
fields as immunology, cognitive sciences, computer
science, sociobiology and culture. Even in evolution-
ary biology, the details of the picture are still ob-
jects of scientific controversies among specialists like
Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, William D.
Hamilton, Richard Lewontin, John Maynard Smith,
Edward Osborne Wilson, to name some popular con-
temporary figures among many others (Segerstråle,
2000; Shanahan, 2004).
With the philosophical bet of building a concep-
tion of the world in a coherent ontology the stakes
are too high for the philosophy of physics alone ; it
must as well rely on a Darwinian like naturalization
that makes some norms to emerge. To remain within
the scope of the present paper, I just wanted to point
out that the formation of some equivalence classes I
denoted by σ can be seen as a natural process à la
Darwin not only when σ denotes a living species, a
pool of genes or of memes (elements of material or im-
material culture, including knowledge, Auger, 1952;
Dawkins, 1976, chap. 11), but also if we adopt a neu-
robiologist point of view. Any class σ, considered as
an object i.e. a part of the physical world (a preda-
tor, a cherry, a pixel, an atom) may be represented
in terms of some neural configuration distributed in
several intertwined areas of the brain. Since more
abstract concepts (
√
2, a quantum phase, entropy, a
blue tiger, Prometheus, beauty, freedom, etc.) and,
more generally, ideas are also encoded in brains via
the neural material support, the insurmountable dif-
ficulty of delimiting what reality is can be understood
at the neurophysiological level (the recursive charac-
ter appears here through consciousness, i.e. when the
model of the world that characterises intelligence in-
cludes a representation of itself). Some concepts (a
cherry, the Moon, an electron, a number, Kepler’s
law, a rotation, yourself) are strongly reinforced and
stabilised by being intricately bound within a large
hierarchy, including observations or sense-data, while
some others (a blue tiger, a tachyon, chess rules,
the pumpkin-coach transformation, Zeus), being less
firmly established, have a smaller degree of reality. As
any practitioner of quantum physics knows it (even
before the modulus of some electronic wave-function
in quantum corrals has been imaged by scanning mea-
surement), the concept of a quantum state generally
refers to a more real entity that the toy concept of a
solid sphere made of gold with a radius of 1 km.
Recent investigations in neuroscience seem to
give a neural basis of an old suggestion made by
James (1880) and to confirm the existence of Dar-
winian (epigenetic) selective mechanisms between
various pre-representations generated by combinato-
rial games throughout neuron networks. Many se-
lectionist processes may be distinguished that are
characterised by transformations of neural states at
different time-scales; compared to the fast dynamics
of, say, decision making, the neural Darwinism in-
volved in learning and memorisation may concern
slower developments of neural circuitry, starting be-
fore birth soon after conception (dendritic and ax-
onal generation or regression, synaptic reinforcement
or inhibition, etc.). The “survival of the fittest" rep-
resentation would be determined by complex tests
of evaluation, reentrance and reinforcements proce-
dures (driven by pleasure and pain for instance) that
involve the internal dynamics of the brain as well
as its coupling to its external environment (includ-
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ing other brains). We still know very few about
how this dynamics is physiologically implemented;
however, it shares many common points with se-
lectionism at another level, namely the evolution of
scientific knowledge. Since the first proposals of an
“evolutionary epistemology” by Campbell (1959, 1960
and their numerous references that anticipated the
subject even if James is not mentioned) and Pop-
per (1979) (see also Toulmin, 1967, 1972; Campbell,
1974), this approach has known many outgrowths
(Radnitzky and Bartley, 1987; Hull, 2001). For a
recent review of the neural selection introduced by
Changeux et al. (1973); Edelman (1978) called neural
Darwinism by the latter (1987), see Seth and Baars
(2005), Platek, Keenan and Shackelford (2007) and
references therein. For a less specialised presenta-
tion see, for instance, Changeux (1985; 2002) or Edel-
man (2006). The emergence of a pattern of successes
from an “overwhelming background of failures” (Fine,
1996, chap. 7, § 1, note 5) in science is therefore ex-
plained in an analogous way as the formation of sta-
ble and viable combinations of genes from the over-
whelming possibilities of deadly mutations (as far as
the cumulative progress of knowledge is concerned,
we have not been able to make up the memetic ana-
logue of such an efficient process like sexuality for
generating reliable combinations. However, in these
matters, from the association of ideas, both at the
mental level and at the human collaboration level,
we are closer to the memetic equivalent of meiosis
than to agamogenesis, see however the conservative
trends described by Toulmin, 1967, § VI).
4.5 Symmetry-assisted research of
simplicity
4.5.1 Simplicity as a general evaluation
against underdetermination
Most obviously, one may fit a given discrete set of
registered events with many different laws (Cournot,
1851/1956, chap. IV). Still, this so-called underdeter-
mination, acknowledged under one form or another
since Epicurus (in the Letter to Pythocles, see Laer-
tius, 1925, chap. X, mainly §§ 86–88) and carefully
examined by Hume (1758/1999), still abundantly dis-
cussed in epistemological debates on induction (Lau-
dan, 1990; Psillos, 1999, chap. 8). Notwithstand-
ing, underdetermination appears to be less serious
than some philosophers think it is, provided that we
take into account the notion of simplicity as one of
the selection criterion (see Poincaré’s 1891 citations
given above together with his 1900a article; Cournot,
1851/1956, chap. IV, § 41; Mach, 1906/1976, §§ X.15,
XXV.6,7 Jeffreys, 1931, chap. IV; Popper, 1959,
chap. VII and 1969, chap. 1, point (6) of the ap-
pendix, chap. 10, § XVIII; Reichenbach 1938, § 42).
Following the same lines of thought drawn above, the
aim of this section is to suggest how the second facet
of symmetry is at work in this Darwinian-like selec-
tive operation.
The problem of simplicity is of central im-
portance for the epistemology of the natural
sciences. Since the concept of simplicity ap-
pears to be so inaccessible to objective formu-
lation, it has been attempted to reduce it to
that of probability, which has already been in-
corporated to a large extent into mathematical
thought (Weyl, 1949, § 21, pp. 155–156).
Here we join back the aesthetical appeal of a
symmetry we briefly recalled in the very beginning
of § 2.1. The harmony of a theory, the beauty
of an argument or the elegance of an experiment
are frequently evoked by scientists (Fresnel, 1818;
Poincaré, 1908; Russell, 1917, chap. IV; Hardy, 1940;
Weyl, 1949, § 21; Heisenberg, 1974, chap. XIII;
Penrose, 1974; Lipscomb, 1980; Yang, 1980; Dirac,
1963, 1982; Chandrasekhar 1987; Weinberg, 1992,
chap. VI; Changeux 2012), some of them consider-
ing it as a constructive principle if not a criterion
of truth. For a curious attempt to quantify aesthet-
ics using a, somehow vague, notion of complexity see
Birkhoff (1933); for a more serious and interesting
study of the role of aesthetics in science see McAl-
lister (1996) where Haldane’s text below is partially
quoted (chapter 7 provides an actualised discussion
on simplicity, see also the diverse contributions on
this subject in Zellner et al., 2001). One reason of
this attractiveness is the gain in simplicity, a parsi-
mony of descriptive means with respect to the wide
range of their scope (see for instance Hamilton, 1861,
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Appendix I(A), fifth theory, p. 580)14.
In scientific thought we adopt the simplest
theory which will explain all the facts under
consideration and enable us to predict new facts
of the same kind. The catch in this criterion lies
in the word ‘simplest’. It is really an aesthetic
canon such as we find implicit in our criticisms
of poetry or painting. The layman finds such
a law as ∂x
∂t
= κ
∂2x
∂y2
much less simple than ‘it
oozes’, of which it is the mathematical state-
ment. The physicist reverses this judgement,
and his statement is certainly the more fruitful
of the two, so far as prediction is concerned. It
is, however, a statement about something very
unfamiliar to the plain man, namely, the rate
of change of a rate of change. Now, scientific
aesthetic prefers simple but precise statements
about unfamiliar things to vaguer statements
about well-known things. And this preference
is justified by practical success (Haldane, 1927,
Science and Theology as Art Forms, p. 227).
Broadening the scope of a theory and reducing the
number of laws and primitive concepts are two faces
of a single coin. The tension between these two antag-
onistic tendencies is the mainspring of the progress
of scientific knowledge. Focusing on just one of those
opposite poles leads to ridiculous positions: on the
one hand, if we consider only very few particular
events, we can explain their occurrence by arbitrary
simple or rather simplistic laws and concepts (this is
one of the main characteristic of superstitions and
pseudo-sciences) and the complication comes from
the multiplication of such ad hoc explanations as
the number of observations increases (see for instance
Popper, 1969, chap. 1, § I point (7) and its appendix
or Worrall, 1989, p. 114). On the other hand, as
Feynman puts it with his inimitable style (Feynman
et al., 1970, vol. II,§ 25-6), from any physical law (not
necessarily discovered yet!) labelled by l, once writ-
ten in the (dimensionless) formQl = 0, we can always
introduce the physical concept of “unworldliness” as-
sociated with this law, namely Ul
def
=|Ql| where | · | de-
14Even before the “least action” or other variational prin-
ciples were acknowledged, a parsimony principle is already
present in Galileo’s work (“Nature does not act by means of
many things when it can do so by means of a few”, 1632, 2nd
day).
notes the modulus or the norm, and write the “equa-
tion of everything” as
U = 0 (4)
where the total unworldliness is given by U =
∑
l Ul.
Of course this trick to hide the complexity under the
simplest conceivable equation remains sterile because
of the artificial and shallow interpretation of U . As
Feynman explains it, this stratagem is not motivated
by any symmetry arguments: because it does not take
into account any transformation rules, its nature is
very different from the grouping of the scalar quan-
tities vµ into one compact geometrical object v (see
§ 3.5 p. 14).
However, since Pythagoras, we can find many at-
tempts based on aesthetic and symmetric grounds
that have failed to provide correct explanations. Up
to his very last years Kepler did not want to aban-
don his cosmological model based on Platonic solids
though he acknowledges, in many notes of the 1621
edition of the Mysterium Cosmographicum, that his
beautiful construction is wrong (25 years after the
first edition and after the discovery of the three laws;
there is some kind of irony here since Kepler himself
contributed to undermine the symmetrical appeal of
the “harmony of perfect spheres” with the first law
which manifests the breaking of the rotational invari-
ance through one individual elliptic orbit). If the ab-
sence of any experimental evidence in the LHC exper-
iments is confirmed, it may be that supersymmetry
should be abandonned, at least in its simplest form.
4.5.2 Symmetry as a pruning tool
One of the major flaws of the attempts to define
physical complexity/simplicity from algorithmic in-
formation theory is that it relies on information com-
pression without any loss (Delahaye, 1999; Li and
Vitányi, 2008, for an upgraded account on this vivid
field and for the original references). In fact, to gain
in simplicity we must be allowed to irreversibly cut
some superfluous hypothesis or initial conditions with
an Ockham’s razor. Moreover, we have seen in § 4.3
that information erasing is essential because classifi-
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cation is primordial, ubiquitous and necessary15. We
cannot avoid working with some equivalence classes,
some of which we nonetheless take as primitive enti-
ties by not considering the distinct properties that al-
low to discriminate its elements, ones from the others.
By quotienting a set in equivalence classes, the sec-
ond facet of symmetry is more a mean of elimination
than a mean of compression. Here we stick to the
original meaning of abstraction, considered as a syn-
onymous of removal (Cournot 1851/1956, chap. XI,
§§ 147-149 discusses several processes of such a dis-
entanglement). Algorithmic reduction appears only
to be a special case of labelling each class by one
privileged element x∗ (specifically, one of the short-
est) and, then, the algorithmic depth of x quantifies
the transformation T that maps x∗ to x = T (x∗).
However, this algorithmic interpretation can hardly
embrace the physical world without substantial new
foundations; because of continuity and randomness,
whether they are fundamental or just convenient,
most, if not all, physical transformations cannot be
reduced in a discrete sequence of binary operations.
As far as I know, nobody has been able to provide
the algorithmic complexity or the algorithmic depth
of an electron.
Here we join back the thermodynamical (or Shan-
non) conception of information, where entropy mea-
sures the loss of information that occurs when con-
sidering a statistical ensemble rather than the indivi-
dual systems (or messages, if we are concerned with
information transmission). The latter is described
in terms of a huge number of variables ϕ (say, the
microscopical variables like the positions and the ve-
locities of classical atoms) while the former is char-
acterised by few variables Φ (say, the average ve-
locity of the atoms, their total energy, etc.). The
art of statistical physics consists precisely in iden-
tifying quantitatively the relevant variables Φ that
15A parallel point of view is proposed by Landauer (see, for
instance his 1967 paper and the collection of papers on infor-
mation erasure edited by Leff and Rex, 2003, specially chap. 4)
and leads to a modest realism different from the one proposed
here. Landauer adopts a strong ontological difference between
mathematical entities and reality by denying the existence of pi,
for instance (Landauer, 1999, p. 65). The proposal I prefer to
defend here is that what pi and a cherry designate differ one
from the other by their degree of reality on a continuous scale.
allow a tractable account of which ϕ’s are compati-
ble with Φ (reduction) and how Φ can be obtained
from ϕ (emergence). We often speak of macroscopic
variables (resp. of a macrostate) when considering Φ
(resp. the ensemble), by contrast to the microscopic
variables (resp. micro or pure state) that refer(s) to
one element. This is often justified because the spa-
tial extension usually allows to intuitively discrim-
inate both systems (fluid/molecules, galaxies/stars,
heavy nucleus/nucleons, etc.). It may also happen,
when studying dynamical systems, that we may take
advantage of a separation of time scales between a
fast evolution of ϕ and a slow, secular, evolution
of Φ. If we want to circumvent the favouritism
of space and/or time, it is preferable to see the
mapping ϕ 7→ Φ as the erasing (the decimation as
Kadanoff would say, 2000, chaps. 13 and 14) of ir-
relevant degrees of freedom. This is the quantitative
formulation of the classification x 7→ σ when the ele-
ments x (resp. σ) can be labelled with the numerical
variables ϕ (resp. Φ); the irrelevant parameters being
those, discrete and/or continuous, that allow to label
the different transformations T of T .
One given statistical ensemble contains microstates
that differ one from the other by transformations
of ϕ compatible with the macroscopic constraints
fixed by Φ. Building out the effective model con-
sists in coarse-averaging that is, integrating out, say
within the partition function, the variables that allow
to discriminate the microstates (in quantum statisti-
cal physics this represents the computation of par-
tial traces of the density operator) and retaining the
dependence in Φ only. Some of the individual prop-
erties of the particles—typically the ones involved in
the interactions like the charges but not their indi-
vidual energy for instance—are unaveraged and re-
main as such among the Φ. How some properties of
the effective system depend on such variables reflects
the degree of universality of the construction. It is
one of the greatest achievements of statistical theory
to have indeed exhibited some quantities (the elec-
tromagnetic radiation emitted by a black-body, the
critical exponents) that depends only on the gross-
est features of the system (the dimension of space,
etc.) and neither on chemical composition nor on
the precise form of the interactions, as does the crit-
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ical temperature of a second order phase transition.
Less universal but much simpler examples of Φ are
the pressure of a fluid or the absorption coefficient α
of a material. Both have their value depend on the
details of the microscopic interactions but, surpris-
ingly, they can be used to characterise a wide variety
of substances whose microscopic structures strongly
differ one from the other (for instance α is involved in
the Beer-Lambert law to describe the light transmis-
sion through a liquid, a gas, a plastic, a glass, a dia-
mond). The emergence of universality due to the law
of large numbers was already noticed by (Langevin,
1923, chap IV, p. 191) and, before him, by (Poincaré,
1911, § IV) who talked in this case of the insensitivity
to large differences in the initial conditions.
More generally, beyond statistical physics, from all
the preceding considerations presented in this section,
we can understand that picking up a small number
of relevant variables Φ out of a wide collection of ϕ
remains an indispensable mechanism of any cognitive
process.
4.6 Emergence
The last line of thought conveys us into the core of
the debate about reduction/emergence issues (Bedau
and Humphreys, 2008). Since, recently, there have
been many discussions on these matters (Batterman,
2010; Butterfield, 2010), I will not venture too long
into this wide realm (see also for instance Castellani,
2002). At the level of abstraction I adopt in this ar-
ticle, I formally take up the stance that emergence
stands for constructing the variables Φ describing σ
from the variables ϕ describing x. Reduction, ap-
pears to be the opposite operation σ 7→ x (the fourth
facet of symmetry, I will have to say more about it
below). Thus, we have identified the two dual ele-
mentary mechanisms from which are built the hier-
archies that structure the physical world and shape
rational thinking. We have encountered an example
of mathematical emergence in § 2.3. In § 4.5.2, I
have sketchily recalled how statistical physics, within
the frame of renormalisation theory, offers what is
perhaps the most precise quantitative illustration of
the rearrangement and elimination of the degrees of
freedoms that allow to establish the relation between
x and σ. In every-day thinking, this is intuitively
accomplished by the categorisation capacity of what
we call the common-sense that make a cherry or a
dog to emerge from a bunch of interweaved organic
molecules (or cells if we want to add some intermedi-
ate structure).
Identifying what properties are relevant or con-
venient at one level and establishing quantitatively
their connection with the properties at other levels
remains a formidable challenge, the nub of scienti-
fic research I would say. There is no general method
following well-established instructions to increase our
comprehension (again, our individual minds and the
web of our socially interconnected minds are rather
more selectionist than instructionist, more Darwinian
than Lamarkian so to speak). This is obvious when
following the reductionist direction; however, it is not
less true when climbing up the stairs in the other way.
Digging out the emergent properties by picking up
a small number of relevant variables among a wide
collection can seldom be done explicitly. Above, I
used the word “art” to qualify statistical physics not,
of course, to deny the standards of rational think-
ing which I fully endorse, nor to indicate a direc-
tion of increasing beauty16, but precisely to empha-
size that there were no general rule of how to elab-
orate an effective theory, and even more to compute
(specially when infinities are to be dealt with), the
Φ from the ϕ. The large number of appropriate pa-
rameters Φ and the difficulties to establish protocols
of their measurements mainly explains why medicine,
social sciences, psychology, economics, ecology, agri-
culture, and even the technical aspects of cooking
etc. are less exact (i.e. predictive with less precision)
than more quantitatively supported branches of sci-
ence like chemistry or physics. The objects of inves-
tigation of the latters are not only relatively much
simpler but also the statistical fluctuations are much
more reduced by the huge number of elements in a
sample (as far as I know it is only in physics that
16As Weinberg (1992, chap. VI) writes it, general relativity
may appear more beautiful than Newton’s theory though in-
volving far more quantities, namely the infinitely many degrees
of freedom of the gravitational field. In Newtonian theory, the
gravitational field does not have a proper dynamics that can be
made, even partially, independent of the dynamics of matter.
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self-averaging quantities can be exhibited). Even in
every-day rational thinking, the variables Φ remain
mostly qualitative rather than quantitative and naive
attempts of their formalisation often appear as dan-
gerous oversimplifications.
5 Invariance
In the introduction of § 3.4, I have shown how the sec-
ond facet of symmetry allows to identify classification
with property attribution. I have explained in § 4.2
why these two equal cognitive capacities, inherent to
any kind of measurement (including perception), can
be viewed as a stabilisation.
The general concept of group pre-exists in
our minds, at least potentially. It is imposed
on us not as a form of our sensitiveness, but as
a form of our understanding ; (Poincaré, 1895,
conclusions).
A sine qua non condition of intelligibility is that
some physical properties must remain unchanged un-
der transformations like some space or time trans-
lations, rotations, etc. I precise “some” because this
stability necessarily exists in a finite portion of space-
time only: The correlated bundle of attributes that
allow to characterise Borges’dog lasts more than one
minute but certainly no more than 30 years. The
norm and direction of the terrestrial acceleration ~g
remain approximately uniform at laboratory scales
but change according to where we are on Earth; more-
over, of course, it is only meaningful in the immediate
neighbourhood of the Earth, which in its turn has a fi-
nite space-time extension. Some quantum properties
like those of the kaonK± last 10−8 s while others like
the electron charge (more precisely the fine-structure
“constant”) seem not to vary on cosmological scales
more than one part in 106 (as far as we can safely
measure up to now)17.
17By the way, while we construct the equivalence classes
we consider as physical objects, whether we prefer to imple-
ment or not invariance under some time-translations remains
a matter of convenience. Both approaches are admissible and
broadly equivalent in a non-relativistic approach but, of course,
the time extension cannot be avoided as soon as relativity is
taken into account since then, simultaneity becomes a relative
It is the greatest merit of Noether’s theorems to
provide a locally conserved quantity associated with
each independent one-dimensional continuous family
of transformations under which the functional driv-
ing the dynamics (more precisely, the action together
with appropriate boundary conditions) is invariant. I
will not devote more attention to this specific aspect
of invariance since the implications and the interpre-
tations of Noether’s work have already been scruti-
nised elsewhere (Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2010; Brad-
ing and Brown, 2004, notably). What I want to pro-
pose in § 5.1 is a more general perspective where in-
variance, viewed as the third facet of symmetry, con-
cerns not only formulations of variational principles
but, in fact, any law of science. Then, in §§ 5.2 and
5.3, I will open this interpretation to even broader
epistemic considerations.
This rudimentary tendency toward “objecti-
fication” reappears in conceptual, in particular
mathematical, thought, where it is developed
far beyond its primitive stage. When we deter-
mine the size of an object by measurement, it
is owing to such “objectification” that we suc-
ceed in transcending the accidental limits of our
bodily organisation. It enables that elimina-
tion of “anthropomorphic elements” which is,
according to Planck, the proper task of scien-
tific natural knowledge. To geometrical inva-
riants have to be added physical and chemical
constants. It is in these terms that we formulate
the “existence” of physical objects, the objective
properties of things.[. . . ] Hering speaks [. . . ]
the language of the scientist, i.e., of realism.
He assumes the empirical reality of the objects
about which our senses have to inform us. But
a critical analysis of knowledge must go farther.
Such an analysis reveals that the “possibility of
the object” depends upon the formation of cer-
tain invariants in the flux of sense-impressions,
no matter whether these be invariants of per-
ception or of geometrical thought, or of physi-
cal theory. The positing of something endowed
with objective existence and nature depends on
the formation of constants of the kinds men-
property. The philosophical numerous discussions between en-
durantists and perdurantists seem therefore neither obscure
nor very interesting once it is illuminated by physics argu-
ments (see, for instance Butterfield’s 2005 point of view and
the references provided there).
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tioned. It is, then, inadequate to describe per-
ception as the mere mirroring in consciousness
of the objective conditions of things. The truth
is that the search for constancy, the tendency
toward certain invariants, constitutes a charac-
teristic feature and immanent function of per-
ception. This function is as much a condition of
perception of objective existence as it is a con-
dition of objective knowledge (Cassirer, 1944,
end of § III, pp. 20–21).
Born is also very clear:
I think the idea of invariant is the clue to a
rational concept of reality, not only in physics
but in every aspect of the world.
[. . . ] not every concept from the domain of
scientific constructs has the character of a real
thing, but only those which are invariant in re-
gard to the transformation involved. [. . . ]
This power of the mind to neglect the differ-
ences of sense impressions and to be aware only
of their invariant features seems to me the most
impressive fact of our mental structure.[. . . ]
Thus we apply analysis to construct what
is permanent in the flux of phenomena, the in-
variants. Invariants are the concepts of which
science speaks in the same way as ordinary
language speaks of “things," and which it pro-
vides with names as if they were ordinary things
(Born, 1953).
I perfectly agree except that I would nuance and
would prefer to say that “not every concept shares
the same degree of reality” because, as I will recall
below, invariance of a “real thing” always appears to
be an approximation.
5.1 Science laws as quantitative man-
ifestations of invariance
Whatever school of thinking one belongs to, what-
ever status one attributes to a science law18, it ought
18Among the overwhelming literature on this subject, I
should mention van Fraassen’s 1989 influential attempt to deny
laws of nature while, strangely enough, keeping the notion of
symmetry. If I am not mistaken, what van Fraassen criticises
is the dogmatic conceptions of laws, specially when we forget
that their quantitative formulations should come with their
conditions of validity.
to be uncontroversial that most, if not all, science
laws yields to relations between quantities x that can
always be written as19
R(x) = 0 . (5)
Frequently, these relations are written in the most
explicit form
q = Q(y) (6)
by privileging among the x’s some quantities, namely
q, against others, namely y. I use here two different
fonts to discriminate between mappings, here Q and
R, and the physical quantities, here x, y and q. These
mathematical relations (often taken by many to be
synonymous of the laws themselves) have a physical
meaning only when they are embedded in a theory
where the quantities x or (q, y), have been related
to observations, via a model incorporating more or
less intermediate other quantities. This does not im-
ply that all the x’s should be uniquely determined
by measurements; some of them may be unobserv-
able, superfluous or irrelevant. Moreover, when talk-
ing about laws, relations (5) or (6) should not be
confused with definitions. “All ravens are black” can
represent either a partial definition of what a raven is
or a law if the class of ravens and the blackness have
been defined by other ways. Both status are mutu-
ally exclusive but remain a matter of choice as we
keep these instances in a coherent network of signifi-
cations. History of science is full of examples where
theorems/laws/synthetic judgements have switched
to axioms/definitions/analytic judgements and vice
versa. See, for instance, the discussion byWeyl (1949,
§ 17, p. 114) on the status of the electric field ~E in
the equation giving the electrostatic force ~F = e ~E;
or Feynman’s 1970, § 12-1 explication of the mean-
ing of the force as it appears in Newton’s second
law ~F = m~a.
A transformation T that is performed on the vari-
ables x defines a transformation of (5) according to
19Inequalities, like Heisenberg’s or the second law of ther-
modynamics can also be turned to this form with the help of
Heaviside step function. The mathematical relation between
the x’s is of course not unique. For instance, E − mc2 = 0
and exp(1 − E/mc2) − 1 = 0 are strictly equivalent expres-
sions. However, here also, a principle of parsimony should
help to select a convenient form.
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the rules
R
T (xT ) = R
(
x(xT )
)
(7)
where, in the right hand side, x are considered as
functions of the transformed variables xT . Then, in
the second case, the transformed function QT is de-
fined by
qT = QT (yT ) . (8)
Relation (5) will be said invariant if the same relation
exists between the transformed quantities xT :
R(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ R(xT ) = 0 . (9)
If q stands for just one scalar quantity with respect
to T i.e. that by definition qT = q (this not an essen-
tial point, the argument can be adapted if we were to
work with non trivial linear or even non-linear alge-
braic representations of T ), then invariance of (6) is
formally equivalent to the equality between the two
functions QT and Q, i.e. for all y
Q
T (y) = Q(y). (10)
In some circumstances, using the tools developed
in catastrophe theory, the structural stability of rela-
tions (5) or (6) is reasonably guaranteed (Poston and
Stewart, 1978; Arnold, 1984; Demazure, 2000, to re-
tain three remarkable introductions to this subject).
Anyway, the general notion of invariance I want to
consider here comes closer to Poincaré’s conception
that pervades in his 1902 quotation in § 3.5. Let us
just mention two simple examples, involving neither
integrals nor derivatives and only scalars, not tensors,
not fields, nor operators: Kepler’s third law connect-
ing the orbital period P of a planet whose semi-major
axis length is a:
P 2
a3
− 4π
2
GM
= 0 (11)
(M is the mass of the Sun, G stands for the grav-
itational constant); and the equation giving the pe-
riod P of the harmonic oscillations of a mass m at-
tached to an ideal spring of strength κ:
P = 2π
√
m
κ
. (12)
First, these equations manifest some invariance with
respect to the usual transformations that constitute
the Galilean group and that can be both interpreted
passively or actively. Indeed, equation (11) remains
as correct now as it was 350 years ago. Equation (12)
is valid in any laboratory on Earth, even if embarked
on a boat with constant speed. However, the raison
d’être of a law is an even broader notion of invariance:
if we actively transform the mass-spring system by
varying the mass m 7→ mT and/or substituting the
spring by a different one κ 7→ κT , we may wonder if
the transformed period of the oscillator will still be
given by the same law
P T = 2π
√
mT
κT
. (13)
Kepler’s third law is valuable not only because it is
still accurate for Mars since Kepler’s century, but
also because we can keep the same relation if we
jump from Mars to Venus (then, formally, a and P
are transformed into aT and P T but neither M nor
G are altered) or if we change the centre of attrac-
tion by considering the orbital periods of the Galilean
moons around Jupiter (now, formally M 7→ MT as
well). Even more, G is qualified as a genuine uni-
versal constant precisely because in a given system of
units (that encapsulates connections with other quan-
tities conventionally considered as standard ones), its
value remains unchanged when performing the previ-
ous transformations.
These considerations can be transposed without
difficulties to any field mature enough to be de-
scribed by reasonably quantitative laws; for instance
to Mendel’s statistical laws of heredity, to equations
governing some Darwinian dynamics or to Kleiber
metabolic law (for refinements on this latter sub-
ject, see for instance Brown and West, 2000). As
we recalled in the introduction, it is in modern quan-
tum theories of fields and in relativity that invari-
ance has been first set up as a constructive principle.
What is postulated is the a priori invariance of q (a
Lagrangian density, an action, a partition function,
a transition amplitude, etc.) with respect to some
transformations or, in other words, the independence
of q with respect to some quantities among the y’s
that appear to be superfluous (the absolute spatial
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position, the gauge fields, etc.). It happens that
these symmetry principles may impose, on the choice
of Q, constraints stringent enough to select the mod-
els drastically and compel specific dynamics on the
interactions (gauge symmetries dictate the proper-
ties of the photon or the graviton for instance). This
line of pursuit yields to a feeling of deep inevitability
(Weinberg, 1992, chap. VI), despite the criticisms of
“the reason which accounts for uniformity in nature”
made by van Fraassen (1989, chap. II, § 2).
5.2 Modest truth and humble univer-
sality
I hasten to add that relations like (5) or (6) remain
always conditionally true. Ideally, in mathematics,
theorems should be formulated with all their hypo-
thesis. In the same way, when faced with empiri-
cal verification and with numerical tests, laws should
come with some error bounds, whether of statistical
or systematical origin, even if their conditions of va-
lidity can never all be explicited Ullmo (1969, § II.B).
In other words, as far as predictivity is at stake, we
should include an evaluation of expected risk or loss.
If we look at any particular law, we may be
certain in advance that it can only be approxi-
mative. It is, in fact, deduced from experimen-
tal verifications, and these verifications were
and could be only approximate. We should al-
ways expect that more precise measurements
will oblige us to add new terms to our formulas
this is what has happened, for instance, in the
case of Marriotte’s law.
Moreover the statement of any law is ne-
cessarily incomplete. This enunciation should
comprise the enumeration of all the antecedents
in virtue of which a given consequent can hap-
pen. I should first describe all the conditions of
the experiment to be made and the law would
then be stated: If all the conditions are fulfilled,
the phenomenon will happen.
But we shall be sure of not having forgot-
ten any of these conditions only when we shall
have described the state of the entire universe
at the instant t; all the parts of this universe
may, in fact, exercise an influence more or less
great on the phenomenon which must happen
at the instant t+ dt.
Then as one can never be certain of not
having forgotten some essential condition, it
can not be said: If such and such conditions are
realized, such a phenomenon will occur; it can
only be said: If such and such conditions are
realized, it is probable that such a phenomenon
will occur, very nearly (Poincaré, 1902, § 5).
Indeed (see § 3.2), any modelisation requires an ab-
straction of the relevant quantities describing the sys-
tem S from the irrelevant degrees of freedom that are
swept away in the environment E . The mass m of
the planet does not appear in Kepler’s third law but
this is true up to terms of order m/M . The latter
may be not negligible any longer if we want to de-
scribe a binary star. If damping is at issue, among
the infinitely many external parameters that have not
been considered in the spring-mass model, the air vis-
cosity must be incorporated in the right hand side
of (12) together with a reinterpretation of P as a
pseudo-period. For transformations such that mT is
too large, we may also quit the linear regime; then,
the period will depend on the initial amplitude (but
still not on the position of the moons of Jupiter!).
One famous criticism against a realistic conception
of science is the pessimistic (meta-)induction accor-
ding to which the falsity of the past scientific theo-
ries should lead us to conclude that present theories
are not reliable either (Putnam, 1978; Laudan, 1981,
1984). However, this argument is fallacious (another
reason was recently given by Lewis, 2001) because it
presupposes for science a too ambitious, unreachable
and eventually meaningless goal. Following Zénon,
the Renaissance protagonist of Marguerite Yource-
nar’s novel The Abyss,
I have refrained from making an idol of
truth, preferring to leave to it its more modest
name of exactitude (Yourcenar, 1976, p. 123, A
conversation in Innsbruck).
Indeed, realism should remain “modest” (Bricmont
and Sokal, 2001) since the reduction of information
requested by any modelisation implies that the truth
of a statement, of a prediction, can be conditional
only. The most we can require from a science law is to
come with the knowledge of its limitation and hope-
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fully with a quantitative control of the errors; but, of
course, this can be achieved once the theory is ma-
ture enough and/or embedded in a wider one as a so-
called effective theory. If we are to use a softer meta-
induction argument (qualifying it as pessimistic or
optimistic is a litmus test to determine whether you
think that the science cup is half empty or half full),
if we follow the lessons of history of science and con-
sider that there cannot be but effective theories. The
“Dreams of a final theory” (Weinberg, 1992) remain
an act of faith not far from the idealistic, therefore
unrealistic, desire of Platonic truth (for a fair and re-
cent clarification on the subject see Castellani, 2002).
Nevertheless we can argue, for instance, that Newto-
nian mechanics remains universally true for macro-
scopic objects with small enough masses and veloci-
ties. Albeit we know relativity and quantum physics,
computation of the location and the dates of eclipses
will still be correctly done within the old classical
framework; the main improvements on the precision
of the predictions and retrodictions of eclipses are
expected to come from a refinement of the planetary
models (possibly with post-newtonian amendments
but certainly not with full general relativity and even
less quantum corrections) and are known to be lim-
ited in time by the chaotic character of the many-
body (classical) problem. In that sense, Pythagoras’
theorem or Kepler’s law have not been undermined
by the development of non-euclidean geometry, gene-
ral relativity or quantum physics.
The thing essential is that there are points
on which all those acquainted with the experi-
ments made can reach accord.
The question is to know whether this accord
will be durable and whether it will persist for
our successors. It may be asked whether the
unions that the science of today makes will be
confirmed by the science of tomorrow. To af-
firm that it will be so we can not invoke any a
priori reason; but this is a question of fact, and
science has already lived long enough for us to
be able to find out by asking its history whether
the edifices it builds stand the test of time, or
whether they are only ephemeral constructions.
Now what do we see? At the first blush
it seems to us that the theories last only a day
and that ruins upon ruins accumulate. Today
the theories are born, tomorrow they are the
fashion, the day after tomorrow they are clas-
sic, the fourth day they are superannuated, and
the fifth they are forgotten. But if we look more
closely, we see that what thus succumb are the
theories, properly so called, those which pre-
tend to teach us what things are. But there is
in them something which usually survives. If
one of them has taught us a true relation, this
relation is definitively acquired, and it will be
found again under a new disguise in the other
theories which will successively come to reign
in place of the old (Poincaré, 1902, § 6)20.
For the same essential reasons that lead us to esti-
mate the degree of reality with a continuous balance,
I prefer not to consider truth to be a binary quantity.
I will not follow Kuhn, specially chap. IX, X, XII,
XIII neither Feyerabend on their emblematic fields:
talking about incommensurability between two theo-
ries is often an overstatement and I would keep the
term to qualify logically contradictory assertions or
dogmatic ideologies only (to play with the words, re-
call that etymologically ‘symmetry’ is the Greek form
of the latin ‘commensurable’). Thus the notion of
scientific revolution is just a convenient tool, at best,
to simplify the vivid evolutionary river basin of sci-
ence made of bifurcations as well as fusions of many
streams. As usual, there is no fundamental cleav-
age but a (seemingly continuous) gradation that sep-
arates entities different in degree but not in nature.
Science laws including their domain of validity ap-
pear to be the far most stable pieces of knowledge;
they give evidence for reality or, rather, these hard
core knowledge have the highest degree of reality.
This is why not only any scientific knowledge must
be falsifiable in the Popperian sense, but it definitely
must be falsified. It is only when a law fails that
we can estimate its domain of validity; then, we can
expect to get a broader law that will encapsulate,
protect and therefore perpetuate the first one.
5.3 Epistemic invariance
Extending the notion of symmetry transformations
outside the usual corral of space-time transformations
gives us a bird’s-eye view of what science laws repre-
sent. In particular, the perspective I proposed above
20See also Poincaré’s quotation given by Worrall (1989,
p. 103).
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allows to reinforce the connection between invariance
and objectivity (see also Nozick’s 2001 general re-
flexions on this point where a non-binary degree of
truth and objectiveness is proposed). Of course we
have preserved elements of human culture much older
than Pythagoras’ theorem, Archimedes’ or Kepler’s
laws but, unlike science laws (Sokal and Bricmont,
1998, the intermezzo), most are crucially dependent
on their contextual signification and appear to be
fragments partially detached from their contempo-
rary cultural background; we appreciate their value
with criteria that are now completely different from
the ones that were in vogue at those ancient times. It
is precisely a cornerstone of the structuralism method
applied to various fields of human science (including
linguistic and anthropology) to find out structural
invariants that are shared by the whole of mankind
(and even further, the functional invariants that are
shared by substrates of variable structure, likewise
the brain functions in regards to the neuroanatomi-
cal organisation, see Changeux, 2002, § VI.7):
Any classification is superior to chaos and
even a classification at the level of sensible prop-
erties is a step towards rational ordering. It
is legitimate, in classifying fruits into relatively
heavy and relatively light, to begin by sepa-
rating the apples from the pears even though
shape, colour and taste are unconnected with
weight and volume. This is because the larger
apples are easier to distinguish from the smaller
if the apples are not still mixed with fruit of
different features. This example already shows
that classification has its advantages even at
the level of aesthetic perception (Lévi-Strauss,
1968, chap. 1).
At a philosophical level, as suggested by Weyl in
the conclusion of his philosophical book, despite the
apparently irreducible divisions between numerous
philosophical schools, we can identify some common
denominators (the invariants) that reveal some sort
of unity beyond what is often—but of course not
always—merely a semantic variation, a matter of sub-
jective preference or a pure intellectual game.
The more I look into the philosophical liter-
ature the more I am impressed with the general
agreement regarding the most essential insights
of natural philosophy as it is found among all
those who approach the problems seriously and
with a free and independent mind rather than in
the light of traditional schemes—or if not agree-
ment then at least a common direction in their
development. Whether one talks about space
in the language of phenomenology like Husserl
or ‘physiologically’ like Helmholtz is less impor-
tant, in view of their substantial concordance,
than it appears to the ‘standpoint philosophers’
who swear by set formulae (Weyl, 1949, end of
§ 23.D, p. 216).
I hope to have shown that symmetry is actually a
good candidate for being such an invariant as far
as rationalists are concerned, among whom, at least,
Poincaré’s heirs like Worrall (1989) (see also more
recent approaches like the one proposed by Esfeld,
2006) and his successors—who belong to the mul-
tiple subdivisions of the structural realist branch
(Bokulich and Bokulich, 2010)—but, maybe, also
the supporters of Fine’s natural ontological attitude
(Fine, 1996, chap. 7) or even those who prefer to en-
dorse Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism.
It would certainly be too presumptuous to para-
phrase Dawkins’expression 1976, chap. 3 and consider
the scientific laws to be “immortal” meme complexes;
however, it is sure that they constitute the far most
stable ones. History shows that they have been able
to resist the most dramatic memocides (like the mul-
tiple destructions of the library of Alexandria) or the
most insidious eumemisms (like the selective copy of
texts during the western Middle Ages that almost
completely stemmed the flow of greek materialist phi-
losophy initiated by the ancient atomists Leucippus
and Democritus, then adapted by Epicurus). Recall,
If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowl-
edge were to be destroyed, and only one sen-
tence passed on to the next generations of
creatures, what statement would contain the
most information in the fewest words? I be-
lieve it is the atomic hypothesis (or the atomic
fact, or whatever you wish to call it) that all
things are made of atoms—little particles that
move around in perpetual motion, attracting
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each other when they are a little distance apart,
but repelling upon being squeezed into one an-
other. In that one sentence, you will see, there
is an enormous amount of information about
the world, if just a little imagination and think-
ing are applied (Feynman et al., 1970, vol I.
§ 1-2).
6 Projection
6.1 Invariance breaking
We have already encountered the fourth facet of sym-
metry in various places.
From an epistemic point of view, this is precisely
the reductionist strategy. The choice of one element
in an equivalence class constitutes the basic operation
of decomposing a class in its constituents: real num-
bers enclose rational numbers, the class of fruits com-
prises cherries, the class of dogs includes Borges’dog,
atoms contain electrons, one-phonon states are built
from condensed atomic states, etc. Together with the
elaboration of effective models and the identification
of emergent properties discussed in § 4.6, reduction
ties the hierarchical web of interlaced concepts.
From a logical point of view, we talk about de-
duction in the sense that we infer some properties on
an x as soon as it is identified as an element of class σ
(e.g., “Hume is mortal because humans are”). In that
sense, x may be considered as a prototype (I prefer
to use this word, following Rosch, 1978, rather than
the too pejorative “stereotype” or the too much con-
noted by idealistic flavour “archetype”) of the class
and a systematic choice of one representative in each
class can be used to label the classes, specially if a na-
tural (canonical) rule can be proposed (for instance,
rational numbers are represented and can even safely
be identified to a fraction of coprime integers). Here,
when talking about the representation of σ by x, both
acceptions b) and c) in footnote 2 fit in this scheme.
There is an alternative way to interpret the pro-
jection operation σ 7→ x. The identification of one
element x among all the others is possible only if
we are able to attribute properties to x that are not
characteristic of σ but, rather, whose values allow to
discriminate its elements. The differences are encap-
sulated in the set T of transformations connecting
two elements. Because of these distinctive proper-
ties, the global invariance of σ under T is broken
since x 6= xT in general. As acknowledged by Pierre
Curie in a famous paper, asymmetry is essential to
characterise the physical phenomena:
What is necessary is that certain symmetry
elements do not exist21. Asymmetry is what
creates the phenomenon (Curie, 1894, § IV,
p. 400).
For more modern variations on this theme, see the
interesting essay by Morrison (1995, On Broken sym-
metries. pp. 99-114).
In practise, the manipulation of concepts often re-
quires the use of one of its representative. For ins-
tance, in theoretical physics computing scalar prod-
ucts requires the choice of a representation of each
vector by introducing a specific basis. In differential
geometry a coordinate chart is most often required to
proceed with numerical computations. When making
measurements, some frame, gauge and units must be
used and, more generally, a measurer M maps some
part of the universe that includes the physical system
at issue (see § 3.1 and figure 1). Let us hand over to
Weyl
A typical example of this is furnished by a
body whose solid shape constitutes itself as the
common source of its various perspective views
(Weyl, 1949, § 17, p. 113).
and Born, who uses an analogy with the different
elliptical shapes of the projected shadows of one cir-
cular cardboard (this simple but acute example is
already in Cournot, 1851/1956, chap. XIII, § 198),
This root of the matter is a very simple
logical distinction, which seems to be obvious
to anybody not biased by a solipsistic meta-
physics; namely this: that often a measurable
quantity is not a property of a thing, but a pro-
perty of its relation to other things. [. . . ] Most
21I translate literally the original French. Rosen and Copié’s
1982 English translation interprets the words “n’existent pas”
in a more appropriate and careful way and propose “are miss-
ing” instead of “do not exist”.
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measurements in physics are not directly con-
cerned with the thing which interest us, but
with some kind of projection, this word taken
in the widest possible sense. The expression co-
ordinate or component can also be so used. The
projection (the shadow in our example) is de-
fined in relation to a system of reference (the
walls, on which the shadow may be thrown)
(Born, 1953, p. 143).
In any case some superfluous variables are introduced
that mask the objectivity by breaking the invari-
ance of the equivalence classes. This is, I guess, the
main source of confusion that obscures some ontolog-
ical or epistemological controversies. One should not
confuse the invariance/objectivity/universality of the
class with the asymmetry/subjectivity/conventional
choice of one of its representation. As Debs and Red-
head write
[. . . ] the claim that these representations
are inescapably based on conventional choices
has been taken by many as a denial of their ob-
jectivity. As such, objectivity and convention-
ality in representation have often been framed
as polar opposites.[. . . ]
[However], a view of science that emphasizes
the role of conventional choice need not be in
conflict with a realist account of representation
that allows for objectivity. One may maintain
a cultural view of science and still be commit-
ted, as most realists are, to the existence of a
single real ontology that humans inhabit (Debs
and Redhead, 2007, Introduction, pp. 3 and 4).
I do not know if Born, when writing the above
text, had also in mind Plato’s famous allegory of
the cave; however Weyl, in pursuing his philosophi-
cal reflections, clearly endeavours to reconcile realism
with idealism (p. 117). Then, in almost exactly the
same terms we discussed in § 3.5, the distinction be-
tween the vector v (“analogue of the objects in the
real world”) and its components vµ (“analogues of
the subjective phenomena") obtained by projection
on a specific coordinate basis (“analogues of real ob-
servers”), Weyl concludes
Hence the model is the world of my phe-
nomena and the absolute basis is that distin-
guished observer ‘I’ who claims that all phe-
nomena are as they appear to him: on this
level, object, observer and appearance all be-
long to the same world of phenomena, linked
however by relations among which we can dis-
tinguish the ‘objective’ or invariant ones. Real
observer and real object, I, thou, and the ex-
ternal world arise, so to speak, in unison and
correlation with one another by subjecting the
sphere of ‘algebraic appearances’ to the view-
point of invariance. [. . . ] The analogy renders
the fact readily intelligible that the unique ‘I’ of
pure consciousness, the source of meaning, ap-
pears under the viewpoint of objectivity as but
a single subject among many of its kind (Weyl,
1949, § 17, pp. 123–124).
6.2 Three open problems
As far as contemporary physics is concerned, there
exists of course an enormous literature on the sub-
ject of symmetry breaking. In addition, part III of
Brading and Castellani’s 2003 compilation explores
interesting epistemological and philosophical impli-
cations of this concept. I will therefore not say more
about these matters. Before we reach the conclu-
sion, I would like to end this section by listing three
open problems, that I consider to be crucial and more
scientific than metaphysical (I believe that any kind
of dualist approach cannot provide a satisfactory so-
lution but just shifts the emphasis of the problems).
All three seem pertained to the fourth facet of sym-
metry.
(PQ) The problem of quantum measurement: How
does the interaction between a system S and a mea-
surer M selects just one observed property or one
observed event among the class of observable ones
that a quantum state encompasses ? A satisfactory
answer must come with a consistent and unified de-
scription of both S, M and possibly E unlike the
orthodox contemporary quantum theory which still
attributes classical properties to M.
(PN) The problem of now: In physics, all the points
of the world line of a system are treated on an equal
footing. In the space-time zone where intelligence has
emerged, what does select a special thin slice of time
we call present ?
(PS) The problem of self: Among all the conscious
minds, what does favour the special one you call your
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self ?
As Born recalls about a quantum measurement
Expressed in mathematical terms the word
projection is perfectly justified since the main
operation is a direct generalisation of the geo-
metrical act of projecting, only in a space of
many, often infinitely many, dimensions (Born,
1953).
Some connections between these problems have
been proposed. If Darwinian selection has not shaped
our brains like a digital device, it has neither prepared
us for a natural apprehension of the world at small
scales. After one century of controversy on the quan-
tum measurement issues, despite the recent progress
on the understanding of the role played by environ-
ment (see note 8), we still do not know if we will
be able to obtain, within a consistent theory, the re-
duction of a (possibly diagonalised by decoherence)
density operator to a pure state or if this problem is
irreducible any further because of our intrinsic limita-
tions. This last line of pursuit follows a tradition ini-
tiated by Bohr and later endorsed by Wigner (1995,
part III) and now defended by Penrose (1997), who
proposed to relate PQ to PS. It is worth noting that
another approach of PS was proposed by Schrödinger
(1944, Epilogue).
By the way, if we consider PS the opposite way by
reversing its terms, viz. if we ask how we can infer the
existence of other selves, we just face the old problem
of other minds (Avramides, 2001). Nevertheless, I
find the problem of self much more interesting than
the problem of other minds because the latter finds
naturally its answer in the necessity of escaping from
a sterile kind of noological solipsism.
Even though quantum theory of fields offers the
most brilliant and convenient way to reconcile special
relativity and quantum theory, it leaves unchanged
the problem of measurement. There seems to be
a deep incompatibility between objective probabili-
ties and a four-dimensional space-time. According
to Everett 1957’s multiworld interpretation, a bi-
furcation between universe branches occurs at each
measurement. Had this attempt come with a pro-
posal that clarifies the special status of measurement
against pure quantum events, it would have ruled PQ
out but at the cost of reinforcing the importance of
PN and especially PS22.
Many physical and philosophical discussions have
been devoted to the arrow of time, but relatively
few concern attempts to physically define the present
(Hartle, 2005). Maybe questions PN and PS are two
aspects of the same question, the first being formu-
lated in physical terms while the other in neuropsy-
chological terms.
A signature of a final theory should precisely be
free of parameters with contingent value. Those who
believe in the existence of such a theory should there-
fore add a fourth problem, possibly connected to the
others with the help of anthropic selectionist argu-
ments (see for instance Bostrom, 2010 and references
therein), namely,
(PC) The problem of constants : How are the di-
mensionless constants like the coupling constants at
low energy scales, some cosmological characteristics
or even the dimension of space-time selected?
However, if we deny such an ultimate goal of get-
ting rid of contingency, the importance of PC is weak-
ened because it is the usual statement of how to digest
an effective theory into the stomach of a wider one.
7 Conclusion
Throughout the twentieth century, the notion of sym-
metry has acquired extraordinary scope and depth in
mathematics and, especially, in physics. In this paper
I have proposed to recognise in this wide domain four
intricately bound clusters each of them being scruti-
nised into some fine structure. First, this decomposi-
tion allowed us to examine closely the multiple diffe-
rent roles symmetry plays in many places in physics.
22It is noteworthy that to try to solve another old problem
of choice, namely the problem of free will, Boussinesq has pro-
posed in 1877 to connect it with the existence of bifurcations
of the solutions of dynamical equations, attributing the choice
of the branch not to an extreme sensitivity to “a very small
change in the initial conditions” (Poincaré, 1959, chap. IV,
p. 76, see also p. 68) but to an external “guiding principle”
(principe directeur) that establishes a fundamental clear-cut
between inanimate and animate beings. If, on the contrary,
we want to remain self-consistent within a unique materialistic
continuum, the “guiding principles” that break the symmetry
must definitely remain internal.
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Second, I have tried to unveil some relations with
other disciplines like neurobiology, epistemology, cog-
nitive sciences and, not least, philosophy. These ex-
cursions and the connections they reveal, that should
gain to be investigated more thoroughly, offer, I hope
an intellectually rewarding transversal journey.
To put in a shell many themes we encountered, I
could not find a better shell than Valéry’s; I cannot
resist the temptation of offering it as the last words:
Like a pure sound or a melodic system of
pure sounds in the midst of noises, so a crys-
tal, a flower, a sea shell stand out from the
common disorder of perceptible things. For us
they are privileged objects, more intelligible to
the view, although more mysterious upon re-
flection, than all those which we see indiscrimi-
nately. They present us with a strange union of
ideas: order and fantasy, invention and neces-
sity, law and exception. In their appearance we
find a kind of intention and action that seem
to have fashioned them rather as man might
have done, but as the same time we find evi-
dence of methods forbidden and inaccessible to
us. We can imitate these singular forms; our
hands can cut a prism, fashion an imitation
flower, turn or model a shell; we are even able
to express their characteristics of symmetry in
a formula, or represent them quite accurately in
a geometric construction. Up to this point we
can share with “nature”: we can endow her with
designs, a sort of mathematics, a certain taste
and imagination that are not infinitely different
from ours; but then, after we have endowed her
with all the human qualities she needs to make
herself understood by human beings, she dis-
plays all the inhuman qualities needed to dis-
concert us. . . Valéry (1964).
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